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June 29, 1980 
Dr. Daniel H. Newlon 
Associate Program Director 
for Economics Division of Social Studies 
National Science Foundation 
Washington, D.C. 20550 
Dear Dr. Newlon: 
M-50- 0.2 
I am a little late in sending you an annual progress report of 
Grant No. Soc - 7820169, Expectations. and Equilibrium Over Time. The news 
is good, however, even if it has been a little slow in developing. 
A major concern of the proposed work is the issue regarding the 
viability of a competitive pricing mechanism in the context of sequential 
trading with unconditional futures markets,where the possibility of bank-
ruptcy infects the consistency of individual agent choice and the problem 
of establishing existence of temporary price equilibria. I spent last 
summer and fall resolving this issue. The price expectations of individual 
agents and the aggregate of these expectations of course bear the burden of 
this resolution. 
At the end of my previous NSF project, the assumptions that seemed 
necessary to solve this problem also appeared to have contradictory implications. 
By the end of summer, 1979, I had finally proved that these assumptions were 
indeed logically inconsistent. The proof employs a fixed-point argument that 
produces a result regarding the structure of agent expectations that could not 
have been anticipated. Fortunately this result also reveals how the original 
work can be modified to obtain existence of a sequence of temporary price 
equilibra. These modifications were undertaken during fall, 1979, when the 
grant paid for a reduced teaching load. 
During winter and spring, 1980, I resumed full-time teaching and began 
writing up the two papers that will contain the economic model and theory 
developed to date. This is an arduous process and will continue into this 
summer. I will use this summer and fall (when my teaching load is reduced 
under terms of this grant) to begin the extensions of the model mentioned in 
my proposal (section D.3) I am anxious to get at the study of merging of 
opinions that was part of my original motivation for undertaking this work. / 
r- 7/1,7 	






October 28, 1980 
NSF APPROVAL GRANTED 
Daniel H. Newlon 
Economics Program Director 
I anticipate, however, that my efforts in pursuing this work will carry 
beyond 1980 into 1981. Under the arranements i currently have, I resume full-
time teaching in winter 1981. I would greatly appreciate it if the funds in my 
grant budgeted for graduate students and secretarial - clerical assistance, a su : 
$12,300, could be used to obtain a reduction in my teaching load for winter 
and/or spring, 1961. This would involve a transfer of these funds, within 
personnel services, from B.3 and B.5 on the budget form to A.1 on this form. 
Please let me know if this transfer can be made. I am looking forward to 
hearing from you. 
Sincerely yours, 
David C. Nachman, 
Associate Professor 
DCN:bw 
Milton R. Blood 
Associate Dean 
College of Management 
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Part II; Summary of Completed Project 
The possibility of bankruptcy is a major obstacle to a competitive theory 
of resource allocation for economies with trading in goods and assets at more 
than one date. A basic ingredient for such a theory is an economically sensible 
model of individual choice incorporating a purely competitive notion of solvency 
and arbitrage restrictions on prices. The demand behavior of individuals derived 
from this model and the arbitrage restrictions implied by it must then be shown 
to be consistent in the usual sense that there is a system of prices at each 
trading date that clears both goods and asset markets, and hence where no agent is 
bankrupt. The evolution of the economy can then be described as a succession of 
temporary competitive equilibrium states. 
It is clear from previous work that agents' expectations regarding future 
prices play the dominant role in any theory of temporary competitive equilibrium. 
The objective of this research is to articulate that role in the context of an 
exchange economy with spot and limited forward trading at each of a sequence of 
dates. The major results of this research provide conditions on agents' expecta-
tions that ensure the existence of a sequence of temporary equilibria. 
First it is shown that, in addition to standard assumptions of temporary 
competitive analysis, if an agent's expectations regarding future prices are 
consistent in the sense that he believes that arbitrage on forward markets is 
impossible, then the agent's choice is determinate and his demand for goods and 
forward contracts is continuous in the appropriate sense. Second, it is shown that 
commoness and compatibility assumptions regarding the collection of agents' expec-
tations imply that for important histories at a given date, including histories 
of temporary equilibria, roughly speaking, every agent believes that any positive 
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spot price system is possible at the succeeding date. This result further implies 
that for these important histories, individual agent and hence aggregate demand 
for forward contracts are bounded below by resources at the subsequent date. The 
two results taken together then lead via standard arguments to the existence of 
a sequence of temporary equilibria. In addition to these results, some preliminary 
work has begun on the optimality of such equilibrium paths. 
Part III: l.c. Data on Scientific Collaborators. 
Robert P. Kertz 
Associate Professor 
School of Mathematics 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
Part III. 1.e. Technical Description of Project and Results. 
Attached are three papers containing the results of the research funded 
under Grant No. SOC-7820169. The papers "Consistency and Continuity of Choice 
in a Sequence of Spot and Futures Markets" and "Temporary Competitive Equilibrium 
in a Sequence of Spot and Futures Markets" contain the major results of this work. 
Both papers are under revision for submission for publication. The third paper, 
"A Note on Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum", represents some first steps 
in exploring the optimality of the equilibria established in the paper "Temporary 
Competitive Equilibrium...." 
CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY OF CHOICE IN A 
SEQUENCE OF SPOT AND FUTURES MARKETS 1 
By 
David C. Nachman 
and 
Robert P. Kertz 
CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY OF CHOICE IN A SEQUENCE OF SPOT 
AND FUTURES MARKETS 1  
By David C. Nachman and Robert P. Kertz 
This paper is the first part of a competitive analysis of an 
exchange economy where markets are open at each of an infinite 
sequence of dates for spot trading and unconditional futures 
contracting. In the absence of institutional arrangements for 
handling bankruptcy, the consistency (determinateness) and 
continuity of agent choice becomes an issue. If an agent's 
probabilistic opinions (expectations) regarding prices are 
consistent in an appropriate sense, then choice is consistent 
and demand is upper hemi-continuous for important price-action 
histories. In the second part of this analysis [29], commonness 
and compatibility assumptions regarding agents' opinions imply a 
specific support structure of these opinions. This structure entails 
that for important histories at a given date individual and aggregate 
demand for futures contracts are bounded below by resources at 
the subsequent date. Existence of a sequence of temporary 
equilibria then follows in a routine fashion. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on the equilibrium ana-
lysis of incomplete market economies [33] with particular emphasis on temporary 
••■••■.• 
equilibria in economies that evolve in time [16]. The objective of this 
research is a competitive analysis of an economy where markets are open at 
each of an infinite sequence of dates for spot trading and limited unconditional 
-2- 
futures trading, and where agents at each date are uncertain only about 
prices that will prevail at future dates. The problem is the viability 
of a purely competitive exchange mechanism in this context of sequential 
trading under uncertainty. 
The problem is really twofold, consisting of one problem of an essentially 
static nature and one of a dynamic nature. The static problem concerns the 
existence of a temporary equilibrium for markets open at a given date, i.e., at 
one stage of sequential trading. The usual method of demonstrating existence 
of a competitive equilibrium is to apply a market equilibrium theorem, e.g., the 
theorem of Debreu [91. The application of such a theorem requires that aggregate 
demand exhibit appropriate behavior over approaches to the boundary of the set 
of admissible prices (c.f.[16: section 3.1]). This behavior can be deduced if 
aggregate demand is bounded below independently of prices. Similar boundedness 
requirements are also needed for application of the more recent results of 
Mas-Colell [27], Gale and Mas-Colell [14], and Shafer and Sonnenschein [36]. 
In the usual case, either no uncertainty [10: Chapter 5] or a complete 
finite system of contingent-claims markets [10: Chapter 7], an individual con-
sumer's choice set, and hence demand, are bounded below independently of prices 
by a priori but natural minimum consumption constraints. In an economy with 
markets for unconditional forward commitments, individual and aggregate demand 
for forward contracts need not be bounded below in the appropriate sense unless 
bounds of an institutional character are imposed. Such bounds are imposed by 
Stigum [39: 	(3), p. 541, (2), p. 545], [40: 	(2.3), (2.8)] in a model with 
spot markets for currently deliverable goods and for consumer and entrepreneurial 
debt, and by Radner [32: (2.1), (5.2)] in a model with an , incomplete system of 
contingent claims markets. 
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In contrast, Green [18] addresses the determinateness of agent choice and 
boundedness of aggregate demand directly in an exchange model that is the proto-
type for the one considered here. There are two market dates in this model with 
spot and unconditional futures markets at the initial date and spot markets at 
at the second or final date. Green [18: Theorem 2.1] characterizes price sys-
tems for the initial date for which the choice behavior of an agent at that date 
is determinate. 
Moreover, Green shows that the desired behavior of aggregate demand in this 
model can be obtained without institutional bounds provided agent's opinions 
about prices exhibit some degree of commonness.
2 Commonness of opinions in an 
ordinary sense of existence of common price forecasts (based on current prices) 
is a necessary condition for aggregate demand to be well defined, i.e., to have 
a non-empty domain [18: (4.1)]. "Beyond this, Green's condition [18: (4.2)] 
requires that agents share an open set of price forecasts for the second date 
that is independent of initial date prices. 
The dynamic problem is posed at the end of [13]. The problem is that of 
determining conditions, if any, under which a history of temporary equilibrium 
actions and prices up through one stage of sequential trading gives rise to 
initial conditions at the succeeding stage that ensure existence of a temporary 
equilibrium at that stage. At each stage of trading, agents must honor contrac-
tual obligations incurred at previous stages. Thus the dynamic problem is one 
of determining conditions under which temporary equilibrium actions at one 
stage entail contracts that can be honored at subsequent stages. This is the 
general problem of bankruptcy. 
At the date in question in [39], there are preexisting contractual 
obligations in the form of maturing consumer and entrepreneurial loans. Stigum 
establishes existence of a temporary equilibrium [3,..2: Proposition III] under. 
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conditions that assume away a possible bankruptcy [22: (1), (2), p. 548]. 
These conditions are relaxed considerably in [a: Propositions 1, 2] to 
essentially the same effect. There is no guarantee, however, that these 
conditions would or could obtain as a consequence of a history of temporary 
equilibria. 3 
In CI: Theorem T.5.7], Arrow and Hahn establish the existence of a com- 
pensated equilibrium with bankruptcy for an economy with preexisting personal 
or household debt. They point out the difficulty in defining a corresponding 
notion of competitive equilibrium with bankruptcy [1: Reamark 1, p. 1213. 
Grandmont [15] and Green C193 avoid this issue altogether by investigating 
rad". 
equilibrium in competitive type models augmented by institutional arrangements 
that may be interpreted as bankruptcy laws. Agents take into account the 
bankruptcy law in deciding to become debtors or creditors Da] or in making un-
conditional futures contracts for sale or delivery of goods [a]. The outcomes 
of these augmented mechanisms reflect then not only the action of the bankrupt-
cy law in case of bankruptcies but they also reflect the influence of the bank-
ruptcy law on agents' decisions. 
While it is desirable to study alternative institutional arrangements for 
handling bankruptcies, such investigations may shed little light on the circum-
stances in which these arrangements may be required. Some understanding of why 
a competitive mechanism fails to avoid bankruptcies is needed. In the context 
of sequential trading, the burden of avoiding bankruptcies must be carried by 
agents' opinions. In the tradition of general competitive analysis, a step 
toward such understanding is made by answering the question, are there 
conditions on agents' opinions that imply the existence of a temporary equili-
brium path in a sequential trading model with no institutional arrangements 
-5-- 
for handling bankruptcy? "In attempting to answer the question 'Could it be 
true?', we learn a good deal about why it might not be true."
4  
This question is addressed here and in a subsequent paper [29] in the 
context of an extension of Green's model in [18] to an infinite sequence of 
market dates. The question is broken into two parts. The first, the subject 
of this paper, concerns the consistency and continuity of individual agent 
choice at each date and over the infinite horizon. Assumptions made regarding 
an agent's preferences and endowments are more or less standard in the 
literature of temporary equilibrium theory. In addition, two assumptions 
are made regarding an agent's opinion. The first consists of four hypotheses, 
three of which parallel assumptions in the literature. The fourth is a new 
(to the best of our knowledge) continuity hypothesis that requires the boundary 
of the support of an agent's (date n) opinion to have subjective probability 
zero. The second assumption also has no counterpart in the extant literature, 
though it is consistent with the interpretation of futures prices as forecasts 
of future spot prices. This assumption and the new continuity hypothesis 
imply that at each date and history at that date the set of prices for the 
subsequent date at which an agent's set of feasible actions is bounded has 
subjective probability one. 
With regard to consistency (c.f. [24]) and even continuity of agent 
choice, these assumptions are clearly of a sufficiency character and no 
attempt has been made to investigate their necessity. For the sake of 
convenience, however, and at the risk of abusing the language, opinions 
that satisfy these assumptions are referred to simply as consistent. The 
assumptions are discussed further in Section 2 where they are presented. 
In Section 3, the feasible action relations for a typical agent are 
defined and the regularity properties of these relations are derived. 
-6- 
Included here are some remarks on the concept of economic bankruptcy. 
In Sections 4 and 5, the agent's choice problem is cast in the framework 
of (non-stationary) dynamic programming. The approach, as in [24], builds on 
the work of Jordan [23 1 The results of [23] and [24], however, cannot be 
applied here directly owing to the possibility of empty values of the feasible 
action relations and the lack of continuity of these relations at some state 
(price)-action histories. In Section 4, the relation between histories and 
attainable futures (probabilities on posterities) is defined and the needed 
regularity properties of this relation are derived. In Section 5, these results 
are used to establish existence of solutions of an agent's infinite horizon 
choice problem and to derive continuity, concavity/convexity, and monotonicity 
properties of derived utility and single period demand relations. 
The second part of the above question, dealt with in 	concerns the 
consistency (in the aggregate sense) of individually optimal sequential choice 
decentralized through the price mechanism at each market date. Two assumptions 
are made concerning agents' opinions that ensure the existence of appropriate 
common price forecasts. The first is necessary for aggregate demand to be well 
defined while the second can be viewed as a dynamic analog of Green's common- 
ness of expectations condition. A third assumption of a compatibility nature 
is made on opinions to obtain a set of admissable prices suitable for appli-
cation of a market equilibrium theorem. 
These assumptions, together with those of this paper, imply a specific 
support structure of agents' opinions. As a consequence of this specific 
structure, at important histories each agent's demand for futures contracts on 
current markets is bounded below by the agent's known endowment at the 
subsequent market date. This result solves at once both the static and 
dynamic problems mentioned earlier. At any candidate for temporary equilibrium 
-T- 
at the given date, agents individually choose actions that entail contracts 
they can honor at the subsequent market date. Aggregate demand for such 
contracts is bounded below by the resources of the economy available at the 
next market date, and the existence of a sequence of temporary equilibria 
for the economy follows in a routine fashion. 
We begin with some notation and terminology. Results, definitions, 
remarks, important conventions, etc., are numbered consecutively within each 
subsection of the paper. 
2. The Model and the Assumptions 
2.1. Notation and Terminology  
Let a denote the set of real numbers, MY the set of positive integers, 
and for m a positive integer, let IRm denote the m-fold Cartesian product of 
a with itself. If x = (x ' xm) E ga and y = (Y mY ) EIFF, x y 
(or y x) means x
i 5 yi
, i = 1,...,m, x 5 y (y Z x) means x g y and 
x 0 y, and x < y (y > x) means xi < yi , i = 1,...,m. We let 1F = 
[x: x E1Rm, x'- 03, e+0 = [x: x , 	 , x 03, and 	(x: x Ee, x > 03, 
where 0 EIF. These relations and sets are defined in an analogous coordinate- 
wise fashion on zr = Itx PRx ---. If x = (x 	xm  ) Ee, 	denotes the 
Euclidean norm of x, while SZ= x(ET. 1 1xi l) -1 provided x 0 0. Similarly, for 
B giRm, 2'= (z; z= 2% x E B, x# 0}. 
For a topological space X,ICX) denotes the c-algebra of Borel subsets 
of X, and 19(X) denotes the set of probability measures defined on i3(X), en-
dowed with the topology of weak convergence. 5 Unless specifically stated to the 
contrary, products of topological spaces are given the product topology and pro-
ducts of measurable spaces are given the product c-algebra [2: 2.6.1, 2.7.1]. 
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Notation and terminology concerning functions, realtions, and correspondences 
follows that in [20: pp. 4-5, 21-28], except that we use the notation 
g: X •-• Y to denote the former and g: X = Y to denote the latter, where X and 
Y are sets. Throughout, the abbreviations "u.h.c." and "l.h.c." stand for 
"upper hemi-continuous" and "lower hemi-continuous", respectively [20: pp. 21-28]. 
For two measurable spaces (Q,2) and (a', J'), by a transition probabili-
ty from 	to Q' we mean a function p:2 X ;7" 	[0,1] such that for each w 
in 0, p(w,-*) is a probability measure on 	and for each A in 2:1 , p(•,A) 
is 3-measurable (mailo,13) - measurable). Alternatively, if -0(0', .77') de-
notes the set of probability measures on ,./7 1 , a transition probability from a 
to 0' is a function p:Q Q(2', .2") such that for each A in ..71 , .1,(.)(A) 
is .9-measurable. 
Some basic sets and spaces of interest in this paper are listed here. Their 
intended interpretations will become clear as the analysis develops. Let 2 
be a positive integer, 2. z 2 (the number of commodities). For each positive in- 
teger n, let C = E:;!, F = 	A
n 
= Cn X Fn , Sn = 	n = An_ i x S n 	4- n H 	 n
, n Z 2, 
and H1 = S 1 . The Cartesian product of any of these sets through n is indicated 
with a subscript "(n)". Thus S (n) = S 1 x 	x Sn and H (n) = H 1 
x 	x H. 
The Cartesian product of any of these sets from n on is indicated with a super-__ 








The symbol for a space without a sub- or superscript denotes the infinite pro- 
duct space, e.g., C = C I xC2 x 	and H = H on) x H (n) for each n. For 
any product space having S
n (Ah )(Cn)(Fn) as a factor, ; (a )(a
1
)(a2) will ide.-! n n n n 
note the projection of the product onto S
n (A)(Cn)(Fn). The map 	1 (;
2) de- 
n n 
notes the projection of any product space with S n as a factor onto the first 
(second) 2 coordinates of S . 
n. 
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2.2. Markets, Co7mo..:::t.es, and Prices  
We consider an exchange economy where markets are open at each of an in-
finite sequence of dates, indexed by M7, for spot trading and limited futures 
trading. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are 2.:2 2 elementary com-
modities traded at each date. Elementary commodities are those distinguishable 
by their physical characteristics and perhaps location but not by date or state 
of nature. At each date, futures contracts may be executed for unconditional re-
ceipt or delivery of each elementary commodity one period hence.
5 Here a peri-
od is simply the time elapsed between successive market dates. 
The terms of exchange at each date n are expressed by a price system, in 
units of account, that assigns to each elementary commodity j two real numbers 
snj and 
sn(z4j), 
 where sni is the spot price and s n(1.41) is the futures price of 
commodity j. To say that at date n the price system s n = (sn1""sn22, ) prevails 
means the following. To obtain a unit of commodity j an agent will in general 
have to trade other commodities or claims to other commodities. To obtain delivery 
at date n of one unit of commodity j in terms of current (spot) delivery of 
commodity k, an agent must deliver to the spot market at n s 
nj/snk 
 units of 
commodity k, provided s
nk 
0 0. If s
nk 
= 0, exchange for commodity j in terms 
of current delivery of commodity k is not possible. To obtain delivery at date n 
of one unit of commodity 
	
in terms of a future claim on commodity k, an agent 
must contract to deliver to the spot market at date n + 1 s nj/sna+k)  units of com- 
-modity k, provided sn(t,+k) 	
ue  0 0. If snfk) = 0, exchange for commodity j 
in terms of future delivery of commodity k is not possible. The exchange 
ratios sn(2.4Disnk and sn(+j)/sn(z+k) 
have similar interpretations when 
theyaredefined.Ifsnj =0, exchange in terms of commodity j if j s z 
or in terms of future claims on commodity j - 2, if j > 2. is not possible. 
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It appears from these interpretations that what is important for agents' trade 
decisions is relative prices. This is in fact the case in standard general equili-
brium models [10] primarily because there is no primitive data of these models that 
depend on prices. In models of temporary general equilibrium, however, agents' 
opinions are data and these opinions at any date depend, in general, on the past 
history of prices and on the prevailing price system. The past history and pre-
vailing price system enter an agent's derived utility function through conditional 
expectation (see Section 5). In this case, the all importance of relative prices 
comes into question. 
From an economic modeling point of view, there are two sides to this ques-
tion. First, one must determine the set of price histories, including current 
or prevailing prices, for which each agent must be assumed to respond by the 
formation of an opinion regarding future prices. Secondly, one must specify the 
range of these opinions. In models of temporary equilibrium, there is every 
reason not to restrict consideration on either side to normalized or relative 
prices :. Not only is demand, in general, not positively linear homogeneous in 
prices, but such restrictions preclude studying price level dynamics of se-
quences of temporary equilibria and formulating and studying hypotheses of in-
flationary and deflationary expectations. While these price level issues are 
not immediate objectives of this work, the model developed here may provide the 
foundation for such investigations. 
The price space for each date n is therefore taken to be S. Although 
in principle agents will be assumed to have a well defined opinion regarding 
future prices at date n for every history s
(n) 
in S (n) , for purposes of 
analysis, only price systems in 	will matter. The role played by normalized 
prices in the sequel will be strictly a technical one. 
2.3. Agent Characteristics  
An agent is viewed as an idealized decision making unit that engages in 
trade at each date, and hence lives forever, and faces uncertainty at each date 
only regarding prices that will prevail at future market dates. The typical 
agent is identificed by a 4-tuple (bo , 	 where b0 = (1)01"'"b09.) E 
w ={wri
}
nEr EC, ry ,9(C) x19(C), and q = (qn 3nezi , is a sequence of transition pro-
babilities q
n : H (n) x An 	n+1), each n in IN. 
The vector b
0 
 represents the preexisting contracts of the agent that must 
be honored at date 1. If b 0 . < 0, the agent has contracted to deliver -boi 
 units of commodity j at date 1 and if b0. > 0, the agent has contracted t  
receive boj units of commodity j at date 1. 
The sequence w is a naturally occurring endowment posterity, with w n 
 interpreted as a vector of elementary commodities made available to the agent 
at date n. In general, at any date prior to n, an agent would be uncertain 
regarding wn . For simplicity however, we assume that w is known with cer-
tainty at date 1. A more realistic point of view would be to assume that an 
agent's endowment sequence is a predictable stochastic process or to assume pre-
dictability of some lower.bounds for the stochastic process of endowments 
(c.f. [31]). These generalizations form the basis of research being conducted 
by the first author on sequences of random temporary equilibria and their asymp- 
totic behavior. 
Assumption (A.1): w 1  + b0  E +0  and wn 	n z 2. 
Remarks (2.3.1): The quantity w / + bo is the agent's naturally occurring 
endowment for date 1 augmented by the vector of preexisting contracts. The 
assumption that co l + b 0  0 is an initializing condition. This assumption 
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together with strict positivity of con , n z 2, is needed in obtaining lower hemi- 
continuity of feasible action relations (Section 3). Some such positivity or 
semi-positivity conditions are common in general equilibrium models. 
The relation 4 is a preference ordering that is assumed to satisfy the 
usual version of the expected utility hypothesis [16: Assumption 1], and a 
risk aversion and monotonicity hypothesis [18: 2.4(b), (c)]. 
Assumption (A.2): There exists a bounded continuous function u:C 
such that (i) if v 1 , v
2 
E .0(C), v 1 	v
2 






(ii) u is concave on C; and (iii) u is strictly increasing on C, i.e., if 
c l ,  c
2 









The sequence q = Cqnj nEv of transition probabilities is referred to as an 
th 
opinion and its a-- component q
n 











) is the agent's subjective probability measure over date 
n + 1 (equilibrium) price systems. The date n opinion q n is the analog here of 
the agent's "expectation function" [16: p. 539]. 
Definitions (2.3.2): For each integer n, define the correspondence 
an :H (n) x An 	Sn+1 by an (h (n) , an) = supp(qn (h (n) , an )), where supp(u) denotes 
the support of the measure u [30: p. 28]. While an has closed values, these 
values need not be bounded. For technical purposes, it will suffice to work 
with a bounded transformation of a
n
. For j = 1,2, let e j = (1,...,1) E 10 2 
 and let Qj = ix E 10 2 : x • e2 = 1], where as usual x • y = Eic! ixicyk . For e ch 


















where "cl" denotes closure. 8 Then a
n 
is compact valued and a
n (h (n), an) = 0 













Conventions (2.3.3): Henceforth, unless specifically stated otherwise, the 
quantifier "for each n in 11" is understood in all definitions, assumptions, 
theorems, etc., in the sequel. Also, if the range of a variable is left unspeci-
fied in such statements it is understood to be the relevant projection or factor 
space of H. For example, in (A.3)(1) below, the range of (h(n)' an) and 
(h'r 
n  a') is the set H (n) 
x A
n
. (n  
Assumption (A.3): (i) If Ek (h (n) , an) = Ek (Nn) , 	k = 1,...,n, then 
qn (h (n) , an ) = qn (Nn) , a(n) ); (ii) qn is continuous and the values of an are con- 
29, 	- vex subsets of 11÷ ; (iii) an is u.h.c. on H
(n) x An ; and 
(iv) qn (int an (h (n) , an)ih (n) , an) = 1. 
Remark (2.3.4): Assumption (A.3)(i) states simply that opinions do not de-
pend on the history of past and current actions. This assumption is implicit 
in most models of temporary competitive equilibrium reflecting the underlying 
assumption that agents are price takers, who, by definition, believe that their 
actions have no effect on price formation. We will alternately write q n and 
objects derived from it, such as an and an , as functions of the entire his-
tory or as functions defined on S (n) as convenience dictates. 
Remarks (2.3.5): The continuity assumption of (A.3)(ii) is also standard 
in temporary equilibrium models [1 6 : Assumption 2], [IS: (3.1)]. As in 
[18: Remark 3.1], this continuity assumption implies that a
n is l.h.c. It then 
follows from (A.3)(ii)-(iv) that an is non-empty ((iii) says this implicitly, but 
so does (iv)), compact, and convex valued and continuous on H
(n) 
x A
n' since the 
mapping x -, x is continuous on 1R
n 
and preserves convexity. +0 
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Remarks (2.3.6): From a strictly mathematical point of view, the con-
vexity assumption of (A.3)(ii) is probably unnecessary since most of the 
results of this paper would hold without this assumption if everywhere a
n 
is 
replaced by co an , the convex hull of a
n
. This greater generality, however, 
leads to the possibility (in [29]) of a temporary equilibrium price system, say 
at date n z 2 for a given history, for which for some agent this price system 
belongs to có a
n-1 
but not to a
n-1 
at that history. Such a possibility seems 
inconsistent with the interpretation of agent opinions as probabilistic forecasts 
of future price equilibria and precludes the possibility that opinions are even 
in the weakest sense realized or fulfilled at equilibrium. The convexity assump-
tion simply avoids this issue and simplifies the analysis as well. The non-
negativity assumption of (A.3)(ii) is . consistent with (A.2)(iii) that implies 
that all commodities are desired [18: . (2.3)(ii)] 
Remarks (2.3.7): The convexity assumption of (A.3)(ii) also rules out 
date n opinions with finite non-degenerate support, as does (A.3)(iv), which 
implies that int a
n 
is non-empty valued. (A.3)(iv) is a continuity hypothesis 
similar in spirit to those made about consumer preferences [10: .Section 4.6] 
4.4•0 
It is used in establishing lower hemi-continuity of the relation studied in 
Section 4. Opinions absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure or 
opinions with atoms that form a countably dense subset of some open convex set 
are consistent with (A.3)(iv). Assumption (A.3)(iii) is also a continuity 
hypothesis analogous to [18: (3.2)]. 
Remark (2.3.8): Let E° denote the graph of int a n . Under (A.3)(ii),(iv), 
is open in 
H(n1)* 
For by Ln 	 (2.3.5), int un 
is a 1.h.c. correspondence. It 
then follows that the triple Oi 	x 
An,Sn.1' int anY_satisfies [8: CST, p.772] 
ro and by the remark following [8: Theorem 2] , L
n 














 are referred to as forecasted price systems, price forecasts, or 
simply as forecasts (at the price history 
s(n)).  If x E I, x is a 
spot (futures) 








larly, if x = s
n+1 
for a price forecast 
sn+1, 
then x is referred to as a 
relative price forecast. For such x, yqii_1 (x) is a spot price forecast and 
yF 2 (x) is a futures price forecast for some scalar y. -n+1 
Definitions (2.3.10): Of particular interest in analyzing agent choice 
is the set of current price systems whose futures price component is a spot 
price forecast for the subsequent date, appropriately scaled. For B ]ha , 
B 0 0, let r(B) denote the smallest cone containing B. For n = 1, define 
Qi = 	(el) E 4+, 	E 	(r (int a 1 (s 1 )))3 , 
and for n z 2, let Qn : 	Sn be defined by 
Qn (s (n-1) ) = (sn: 1.1 (st1 ). 	
;21 (sn) E li+I (r(int an (s (n_ i) ,sn)))3 . 
Then Q
n 
associates to a price history 
s(n-1) 
the set, of date n price systems s
n 
that are positive and whose futures price component 2 (s 
n
), perhaps after some 
 
scaling, is a spot price forecast for date n+1 at the history (s (n_i) ,sn). A 
similar interpretation applies to the set Q 1 , which is the analog here of the 
set S in [18: p. 116]. 
Remark (2.3.11): It follows from (2.3.8) by a straight forward argument 
that Q1 is an open subset of S 1 and that for n z 2, On is open valued and has 
an open graph in S(n). 
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) is that at these prices 
and only at these prices is an agent's set of feasible actions at date n 
bounded (Theorem (3.2.2)). In light of this result, it seems reasonable to re- 
quire that Q l 0 0 and that for n z 2 and each st n-1)' 





) C int (cl_Qn(s(n-1)))- For technical reasons_it is convenient, 







(n-1) ). This would be the case under the 
assumption that 
Qn(s(n-1))  has subjective probability one if this set is a 
regular open set, e.g., if it is convex. These conditions, however, are not 
necessary or interpretable, and we assume the desired result. 
Assumption (A.4). Q
1 
 0 0 and for n a 2 and 
s(n-1) in S (n-1)' 
int an_1 (s (n_1) ) 	Qn (s (n....1) ). 
Remark (2.3.12): In the presence of (A.3)(i), the non-negativity and convexity 
parts of (A.3)(ii), and (A.3)(iv), the inclusion assumed in (A.4) is implied by a 
version of the expectations hypothesis that, for positive current futures prices, 
conditional expected spot prices equal current futures prices. To formulate this 
hypothesis, let q = (LinnEls be an opinion satisfying the parts of (A.3) just 
mentioned, and let cl o E Q(S 1 ) be some (subjective) distribution for initial date 
prices. The sequence [qn 0  determines a unique probability measure on (S, 13(S)) 11.  
[2: Theorem (2.7.2)], call it P, and for each n 	1, q
n 
is a regular conditional 
distribution for P of 
n+1 
given 	 p. 79], where these functions 
are the projections of the infinite product space S onto the factors S
n+1 and 
respectively. Thus a version of the (vector of) conditional expectation(s) 
under P of n+1 given n is given by the composition of the vector 
integral fsn+Iqn (dsn+i ls,,...,sn) (which exists by non-negativity of the support 
an (s i ,...,sn )) with the mapping s
n
(s)). Suggestively, let 
- 17-- 
E(Cn+1 ! 1 ,...,Cn ) denote this version. Clearly, the projection of E(C n+1 1C 1 ,...,Cn ) 
onto its first 2. coordinates is a version of the conditional expectation of date 
n + 1 spot prices, E 4.1 , given C., 	which we also denote suggestively by 
E(E
n+1 
for every s E 
1 	1 
,Cn
). The expectations hypothesis is that E(Cn+1 1C 1 ,...,Cn)(s) = E 2 (s) 
S such that E 2 (s) > 0 (note the integrability assumption implicit 
1 	r 





 for some positive 
scalar function A defined on S and measurable with respect to C 1 ,...,Cn .) But 
under the convexity assumption of (A.3)(ii) and (A.3)(iv), it follows that 
E(c14. 1 1E 1 ,—., )(s) E int a (C 1 
 (s),..., (s)) for every s E S. Thus from the 









n 	•  
1 
(here using En1 as the projection of Sn+1 onto its first 2. coordinates). In 
particular, if n z 2 and C
n
(s) E int an-1(C1(s),...,Cn-1(s)), then 
En (s) E n (C 1 (s),..., n-1 (s)), as assumed in (A.4). 
Remark (2.3.13): The expectations hypothesis just formulated violates the con-
tinuity assumption of (A.3)(ii) if the parts of (A.3) assumed in (2.3.12) are main-
tained. For suppose that s
k 
= (s l ,s 2 ,...) E S, k = 0,1,..., with s
k converging 
to s 0, sn
k = ca (sk) > 0, k = 1,2,..., and E2 (s 0) = 0, some j = 1,...,2., where nj 
2 
nj 




e,n+li denote the j---- coordinate 
	
, 1 	k 	2 	k limk, /c1+i dq = limkEnj (s ) = 0, and hence, by the non-negativity in (A.3)(ii), that 
the sequence of functions fk E E 1 n+lj on the measure spaces (Sn-f l' 18(Sn+1 ), qn ), 
k = 1,2,..., is uniformly integrable [20: (40), p. 52]. But under the continuity 
assumption of (A.3)(ii), qn converges weakly to q0 . It follows that 
1 	 1 
fc+li dqn
0   = li- 'k SSI+lj dcin = 	
[20: (42), p. 52]. But this is impossible under 
the rest of (A.3)(ii) unless the marginal distribution of 	n+lj   under q0 is de- 
generate at zero, which violates (A.3)(iv). 
here). (More 
Let qn = qn (s i ,...,sn), k = 0,1,..., and let 
of n+1. 
The expectations hypothesis entails that 
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The dilemma posed by these last remarks is a dramatic example of an ex ante 
version of a fundamental problem raised by Jordan [22: pp. 455-456]. In the present 
case this problem amounts to the choice between positivity of subjective opinions 
about equilibrium prices and the continuity of these opinions on the boundary of 
positive prices on the one hand and the ex ante unbiasedness of current futures 
prices as forecasts of future spot prices on the other hand. If one insists on 
the former, one cannot have the latter, i.e., expectations about (the unbiased es-
timates of) future spot prices must differ from current futures prices at least in 
some neighborhood of each boundary point of positive current futures prices. 
While the expectations hypothesis has considerable intuitive appeal and it 
does explicate the inclusion assumed in (A.4), it is by no means compelling either 
as an a priori hypothesis, the relevant case here, or as a condition of equilibrium 
in a competitive setting with or without rational expectations. 9 One might avoid 
ruling out the expectations hypothesis in the context here by foregoing continuity 
of q
n 
on the boundary of R
22, while maintaining lower hemi-continuity of an on 
this boundary, but we have not explored this possibility. Alternatively, one might 
modify the hypothesis so that it holds, for date n, only for those price systems 
in int an_ 1 (•), for this is all that is required to produce (A.4). In anticipation 
of [29: Theorem (3.2.2)], however, the contradiction produced in Remark (2.3.13) 
would remain. 
Finally, we note that (A.4) is itself a weak form of a restricted expectations . 
hypothesis. It states that the futures component of every price forecast for date 
n is, up to scale change, a forecast of spot prices for date n + 1, where the 
term "forecast" is used in the weak sense of (2.3.9) as opposed to conditional mean 
forecasts. This provides sufficient intuition for this work to proceed on the basis 
of (A.3) and (A.4). That these assumptions are consistent can be seen by a trivial 
2Z 	 2 example. Let qn E v E e(R "") with v(11++) = 1 and supp(v) = R+Z  . Then (A.3) 
holds, Q=Qn (s
(n-1))  E M.214 and consequently (A.4) holds as well. 
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3. Feasible Actions 
3.1. Bankruptcy  and Feasibility  
At each date n, when feasible, an agent chooses a vector c n in Cn of 
elementary commodities for consumption and a vector b
n 
= (on"...,b) of 
futures contracts, where b
nk 
 > (<) 0 indicates a contract to receive (deliver) 
l b 	units of commodity k at date n + 1. To determine feasibility, agents nk 
use the prevailing price system at date n,to present value their known endow- 
ment augmented by previous contractual obligations. 







a vector of net futures contracts made at date n-1 corresponding to the 
vector of futures contracts 
bn-1. and ( fn-1' wn+1
) is the part of the agent's 
known endowment, augmented by preexisting contracts, relevant for trade at 
date n. The sense in which f
n 
represents net futures contracts made at date n 
is explained below. Since f
n 
is determined when b
n 
is and vice versa, we can 
focus on f
n 
as the futures part of the agent's action at date n. Formally, an 











denotes net futures contracts. A history h (n) in H (n) for 
the agent is then a sequence of prices and actions up through prices at date n. 






) is the vector of net futures contracts 
made at date n-1 with the convention that a 0 (11 (1)
)Ew +b mf 
0 - f0. 









) = C n (h(n)n ).(a--1 (h(n) ), wn+1  ). Then r 	is agent specific and 
rn (h (r) ) is the present value at prices Cn (h (n) ) of the agent's known augmented 
endowment at the history h (n) . If rn (h (n) ) 	0, the agent is solvent at h (n) , 
and in this case the agent may execute spot trades and futures contracts subject 
-20- 
to the usual budgetary restriction, i.e., the o.nt may choose an action fr= 
the budget set D;(h (n) ) F-= (a 
n  E A n : E (h, ,)-a n 	ri ) r (h C  )1. If rn (h (n) ) < 0, 
the agent is (defined to be) bankrupt at h (n) , 	in order to avoid instit -.3.- 
tional arrangements for handling bankruptcy, 	budgetary relation is defined 
to be empty at h (n) . Formally, the budgetary r.Lation Dn1 : H (n) 	An is 
defined by 
Dill (h(n) ) = 	)), if rn (h (n) ) 	(), 




Remark (3.1.3): Clearly rn is a contlun , Ins function and 
dom D1 = (11, N) 	0 3 (n): r  n 01) is a closed set lit; is any section of this set. 
If there is to be any hope for det ,rminateness of intertemporal 
choice with the specifications of (3.1.2), an nif,nnt must plan to be solvent 
with subjective certainty. 
Definition (3.1.4): Define the relation 	H 	A by 
n (n) n 
Dn
2 
 (h (n) ) = (anE An : qn (dom Dn1 i.l (how an )ih (n) , an}_= 13. 
2 
Then D (h 	) is the set of date n actions who 
n (n
hom with subjective Probability 
one the agent will be solvent at date n + 1. 
Remark (3.1.5): Dn
2 
(h (n) ) = (a : r 	(h n n+1 n+1
) 	0, 	s 	E a (h, ,,a )1. 
n+1 	n ln) n 
This follows from the fact that the section L?, 
	
(h, „a ) is closed and 
n 
a (h 	,a ) is the smallest closed set with .,, kt‘ 
n (n) n 	
(1 	.,a - measure one 
n 
[b: Theorem 2.1, p..27]. 
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Definition (3.1.6): Feasible actions for the agent at date n are those 
that satisfy the budgetary relation D 1 and the planning relation D
2
n , i.e., the 
feasible action relation D n : H (n) A
n 














(h (n) ). 
We let An = graph Dn = ((h (n) ,an ): anE Dn (h (n) )3. 
Bankruptcy, as we have defined it, is synonomous with negative net worth, 
,nd is, as Stigum [41:c10.1 1.2] has noted, somewhat arbitrary from an economic 
theory perspective. According to this point of view an agent should be declared 
bankrupt only when he cannot meet his maturing contractual obligations by trading 
on current markets. The appropriate formulation of the budgetary relation in 
-1 
this case would be simply the budget set relation D
n
. An agent would be bankrupt 
-1 
at h (n) 
in this formulation if and only if D
n
(h (n1




). For intertemporal consistency then, one would define 
Dn2((n)) 
 as 
in (3.1.4) with dom 5 	replacing dom D 1 n+1 n+1 . 
The problem with this formulation is that under (A.3)(i), if 
r(n1 x [03) = [s.+1 : Et,1 (s..1 ) 
which holds under (A.3)(ii),(iv), 
0 = 2 (s 	)3 
n+1 n+1 
then 52(h(n) ) = 
has qn (h(n) ,an )- measure zero, 
A
n
. Thus for 52 to impose 
'some constraint on choice at date n and history h (n) , it is necessary that 
F(S2 1 x [03) have positive c (11( n)  ,,a n
)- measure, for some and hence all an . 
Establishing existence of temporary competitive equilibrium in this case by 
the methods employed here and in [29] appears difficult. 3y these methods, the 
set r(21x (0)) must, in a sense spelled out in [29], constitute part of the 
boundary of r(an (h (n)' an )) for appropriate h (n). 
The need for Dn
2 
  to impose a constraint on date n actions stems from the 
fact that if 
Dn(n)) r  0, this set is not bounded and is unbounded in the 
-22- 
2 	 ,1 











This follows also for D
n
1  , but as will be shown below, Dn
2 
 imposes the needed 
bounds for appropriate histories. In this regard, the definition of bankruptcy 




As a final comment before turning to the analysis of D n
, note that the 
accounting inequality cl (h (n) )•a
n 
s rn (h (n) ), in one sense, entails that the 
agent sell his entire date n + 1 endowment w
n+1 
on the futures markets at date 
n. For if f 	= ar _1 21(h(n) 	n ) and a = (cn
,f
n















where of course 
n 	 n 	 n  
b
n-1 	fn-1 	(1111+1. 
This is the sense in which f
n 
represents net futures con- 
tracts, total futures contracts bn net of the endowment - wn+1 . Since we 
impose no restrictions on the choice of f n that would not be imposed on the 
quantity wn+1 + b
n 






is a true identity 
throughout our analysis, whether or not the agent must sell his future endowment 
is a matter of interpretation. 
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3.2. Regularity of Feasible Actions  
In this section we are concerned with regularity of the relation 
D
n 
defined in (3.1.6). Throughout this section and the sequel, Assumptions 
(A.1) - (A.4) are maintained. The first result concerns closedness and 
convexity of Dn . 
Lemma (3.2.1): A
n 







closed and convex valued on H (n) . 
Proof: Clearly 0 E 
Dn(h(n)) 
 for every h
(n) in dom Dn
. By (A.1), 
c dom D
1, 
and for n z 2, (11 	• a2 (h 	 ) E14!) 	dam D. (n) . n-1 (n) ' n (n) 
Thus A
n 
0 0. The remainder of the lemma follows essentially as in 




The interest in Q
n 
stems from the following characterization of histories 
h
(n) 
for which Dn (h (n) ) is bounded. 
Theorem (3.2.2): If h (n) E dom Dn , then Dn (h (n) ) is bounded if and only 





and thatn(h(n)) E 0
n 
 (E ( 
- 	-h (n) ) ' 	' 	(h (n) ) ) 
The proof that Dn (h (n) ) is bounded is by contradiction, essentially as in 
[18: Lemma 2.2]. If 
Dn(h(n)) 
 is not bounded, there exists a sequence 
(ak kE
lx Dn(h(n))  such that ilakik- =. It follows that either Hal(a
k 
 )1i÷ = or 
11a 2 (a
k
)11÷ a.. Since a
k 










k,(YEn(n)), p)) 	0 hold for some 
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scalar y > 0 and some p in IFzQ and all k in IN. If Ha2 (a
k
)11 + =, then using 
r 	' 
these inequalities one can find a subsequence ta
k 
  ; of (a
k1 and a price 
' system s 	in int a
n (h (nr a












) < 0 for k' sufficiently large, in 





) for all k. 
Thus it must be the case that fIal(ak )114- =. But akE Di(h(n) ) for every k  
implies that 0 5 0(h
(n)n n ).al(ak) 	rn(h(n)) 
 - 2(h
(n)n 
).a2 (ak) s M for some 
M < =. By definition, q(h (n) ) E IF. and cq-1 (h (n) ) E i, and the contradic-
tion ensues. 
To prove the converse, let h (n) be in dom D
n 
but assume that 





) is not bounded. Therefore, assume that 0(h(n)  ) > 0. 
The proof in 
n  
this case follows [18: Lemma 2.5] . Since h
(n) 
 is fixed, let 
r = ro-n (&(11 (n) ) ' ...,&n (h (n) ))) ' Then r is a convex cone and . 
int r runt an(yh (n) ),...,si th uo mT‘ 0. By Assumption, for every 
y > 0 and p in 	(yq(h (n) ), 	q int r. Let r' = (x E 	E r, some 
y E 	By [35: Theorem 6.8] and openness of the projection map of EP onto 
, it follows that for every y > 0, y(h (n) ) g rite = int rt i 0. 
By the usual separation arguments [35: Theorem 11.6], there exists a 
vector y in IR such that y 	0,
2 (h(n) )•y = 0, and x•y 	0 for all x E r'. 
It is then easy to show from these properties that (0,Xy) E Dn (h (n) ) for all 




) is unbounded. ❑ 
Let Qi = Q1 and for n s 2, let Qn denote the graph of Qn considered as 




is u.h.c. and compact valued at each point of 
dom D
n fl Qn . 
Proof: By Lemma (3.2.1), (i) An is closed in H on) x An , (ii) Dn is 
convex valued on dom D
n' 
and (iii) 0 E Dn(h(n)) 




By Lemma (h.r) in the Appendix, Da is u.h.c.. st each h (a) in dom Dn where 
Dn (h (n) ) is compact. The result then follows from Theorem (3.2.2).7 
Definition (3.2.4). For each n, letn+1. • H (n) x A
n 
 +a be defined by 
n+1 (h (n)' an
) = min [rn+1(h(0'ax): x En(hcpran)1. Then rn+l (h (n)' an )  
is the minimum present value, in terms of relative price forecasts and their 















 (h (a) ) if and only if r ( -n+l -h (n)' an 2 0. 
Proof: Follows directly from Remarks (2.3.5) and (3.1.3) and the usual maxi-
mum theorems, e.g., [20: Corollary, p.30].0 
In establishing where D a is l.h.c., one encounters a problem analogous to 
the minimum wealth problem of standard general equilibrium analysis [10: Section 4.8:. 
As one might expect from this analogy, Da is l.h.c. wherever r a is positive. 
Let Dn = ih (n) : rn
(h(
n)
) > 03. 
Theorem (3.2.6). Da is I.h.c. at each point of D+. 
Proof: Let h
(n) be in D+ and let [h
k 
kEZT 




n) = h(n). 
-26 - , 
Since D
n 













choose f in 44. such that E2(h (n) )•f < rn (h (n) ), and let a = (0,f). Then 
a E Di(h(n) ). Also (f' wn+2  ) >0 and hence rn+1 (h(nr a) > 0. By Lemma (3.2.5), n  
a E Dn(h(n)). For each scalar A with 0 sA s 1, let a(A) = Aan + (1- X)a. 
L'y Lemma (3.2.1), a(A) E Dn(h(n)). Tn particular, for 0 s A < 1, 
ci (h (n) )•a(X) < rn (h (n) ) and by Lemma (3.2.5) again, in+1 (h (n) ,a(A)) > 0. 
It is then straight forward, as in [18: Lemma 3.33, to construct a subsequence 
{h(n) 3 of 
(h(n)3 








= an . By [20: Theorem 2, p.273, this completes the proof.0 
Remarks (3.2.7). Certainly IFS x 	
+
, and for n 	2, 
1 
ih 	• a2 (h 	) E14.,E 	1 ).E 	x 401 D
+ 
The important histories (n) . n-1 (n) n (n) 
with regard to regularity of D n can then be identified as follows. Recall the 
* 	* 
definition of E: in (2.3.8). Define Hi = Qi , and for n z 2, define 
*' 
Hn = (An-1 x S n 	I )n 10 . By Lemma (3.2.1), Hn 0 for each n. 
* * 
Lemma (3.2.8) . H
n Dn n Qn • 
* 











> 0 and hence Q Q D 
	
For n Z 2, let h
(n) 
. ni ,a 	, 1 	. ' (n-1) n-I sn ) 






n) Z 0 for all 
s' in a
n-1









) = 0, then 0 n  (s')-a21 (an-1 	' ) = -r2n (s').wn+1 < 0. By n 	n   
altering an appropriate coordinate of ql (s') one can produce sir; in 
in int 
an-1(h(n-1)'an-1)  such that e(s") = e(s 1 ) and 0(s")•a2 
(a ) < 
n n 	n n 	n n n-1 n-1 
& III (sn )..ce121-1 (an-1). But then rn(h(n-Wan-l'sn) <0, a contradiction. It 
follows that r
n (II (n-1)' an-1' sn) >0, and the proof is complete. 0 
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4. Attainable Futures 
4.1. The Dynamic Programming Problem  
In general, an agent's choice of an action at any market date n can 
depend on the entire history h (n) experienced by the agent up to date n. 
As is common in formulations of sequential decision processes, it is con-
venient to allow the agent to make this choice by randomizing over feasible 
actions. 
Definitions (4.1.1). A date n strategy is any function r
n
: H
(n) 	'(An ) 
such that r
n 
is a transition probability from H
(n) 
to An. In the context 
here (see Lemma (A.II)), such a function 7
n 
is a transition probability if 




)/73:(49°(0i )) - measurable. A date n strategy r
n 
is 








) = 1 for all h
(n) 





has closed values, r
n 













. The set of all feasible date n strategies is denoted 
by nn . 





, otherwise. It is easy to check that the correspondence 
Dn 
has a measurable graph and a-compact values. By [6: Theorem 1], there 
exists a1B(H
(n)
)- measurable function r 
n




Identifying Trn with the function whose value at h (n) is the probability measure 
degenerate at 
rn(h(n)) 
 makes rn a transition probability and clearly then 
rn E Rn . 
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Definiticns (4.1.3). A (feasible) date n plan is a sequence 
7 = i7
mm Z n' 
where
m 
is a (feasible) date m strategy for each m z n. 
The set of feasible date n plans is denoted by li n. A date 1 (feasible) 
plan is referred to simply as a (feasible) plan, and II denotes the set of 
feasible plans. 
Given the agent's opinion q = (q n3nE1m and a date n plan nn = (rmjm n , 
there is a transition probability irnq=_ 7rnqn7rn+iqn+1 .... from H (n) to 
H (n) given by the standard (conditional) product measure theorem 








n+1— = qn-1 7r
nq from  H(n-1) x An-1 
to S
n 
x H(n) . For a plan 
r, we let nq = riql 7r 2q 2 ... . 
Expected Utility Maximization (4.1.4). The infinite horizon choice 
problem for the typical agent satisfying (A.1) - (A.4) is to find 7r* E n, if 
it exists, such that 





1 and every it in II, where proj c 
denotes the projection of 
H (1) onto the set C of consumption histories and u is the utility function of 
the agent given in (A.2). In words, the agent seeks a feasible plan that 
maximizes his expected utility (the integral above) for each initial date price 
system in Q1 . This last restriction of the problem arises because of the 
characterization of Theorem (3.2.2). 
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4.2. Attainable Futures: Continuity and Compactness  
In Section 5, we show that the problem of (4.1.4) does indeed have a solution 
and that the corresponding demand relations for this solution have the regularity 
properties needed for the equilibrium analysis of [29]. To prepare the way for 
this solution, we consider an important relation between histories and posterities 
at a given date. 10 










n) = (v E -19(Sn+1 





J. .g  
The relation 6- associates with a history (h (n) ,an) through date n the set of 
probability measures on posterities at (h (n) ,an) that are attainable by following 




) are referred to as 
n  
attainable futures. The relation I is analogous to Jordan's future decision 
rule relation [23: 2.5] and the relation F n of [24: (2.6)] was modeled on 
f with the current action variable included as part of the future at n. 
0 





agent can be viewed as selecting for each feasible action a n an attainable 
















 to maximize this maximum expected 
utility conditional on h (n) . The agent's demand relation is derived from this 
second stage of optimization. 
Application of the usual maximum theorems is crucial in this two stage 
optimization process. The regularity required for the first stage is given in 
-30- 
the following theorem. The proof of this result is involved and is given 
in Section 4.4. 




, and 1 IAn  is continuous and n  
compact valued. 
4.3. Attainable Futures: Convexity and Monotonicity 
To obtain concavity and monotonicity of the derived utility function of 
an agent, it is necessary to have a particular convexity property and a 
monotonicity property of the correspondence I. The convexity property, the 
prototype of which is due to Jordan [21: Proposition 2.333, involves the 
following setting. For i = 1,2, let an
i 
 = (how an
i 
 ) be an element of A
n
, 
i 	 i 	i 	i 	 1 and let vi be in I;(6n), v. 	ai where Tril+k E Hrr  for i = -nrn+1511+11n+2 —(6n) ' 
each k in lg. For a given 0 < a <1, let 6 = a6 1 + (1 - 5)6
2
. It follows 
n 	n 	 n 
from Lemma (3.2.1) that a
n 
belongs to A. It is not the case necessarily, 
however, that OV
1 
 + (1 - $)v
2 
belongs to 1 (6 ), i.e., the graph of 
n n 
(A need not be convex. 
n n 
There is, however, a method of combining v
1 and v. so that the resulting 
combination belongs to 1n (6n) and this combination is all that is needed to 
establish concavity of the derived utility function (Lemma (5.3.1)). 
Notation and Definitions (4.3.1). Let H
1 = H 1 and for n z 2, let 
Hm = An-1 x An-1 x Sn . Then as in Section 2.1, H (n) = fi 1 
x 	X H
n and 
H (n) 	=i1 
n+1 











x ii (a+1) 	s 	x H (n+1) 
	
. 	If 	0 <a< I, let




+ (1 - 8)a2+1 , 	sn+2 , 	San+2  + (1 - 
5)a
a+2
- 	' ...), 
1 
a2 	s 	a 	a
2 	
...), with ai 	in An+k' all k. n+I' n+2 , 	n+2' 	n+2 , n+k 
-31- 
Since A




. For each k in  IN, let H(n) 
(n+k) = Sn+1 	
.., 
x H 	x ... x H n+2 n+k 
(n)  with H
(n+1) = Sn+1' and define in+k• H (n+k) -.. g(An+k x An.I.,k) by 
L, 2 
.6n+k 	 a sn+1' sn+1' n+1' sn+2" . " s  n+k )  
2 = 	 1 Tr
1 	
(6 	s
1 . 	)x /1- 2 	(6 	s2 n+k n' n+1' an+1 , sn+2". '
s 
 u+k 	n+k n' n+1 1 an+1' sn+2''''' sn+k ) ' 
where "x" on the right here denotes the classical product measure [2: Theorem (2.6.2):. 
-n) The function ft




n+k x An+k We obtain a measure 	on Sn+1 x 
H(n+1) 
 by piecing the *n+k together 




, evaluated at 6 O i.e.,0=qft 	 J q 	ft 	...(8 	+9(Sn+1 	) 
	
n n+1 n+1 n+2 • Finally, the n 
map 	can be used to induce 0 onto 	S
n+1 
x H (n+1) , i.e., define 
^ --1 
v(B) = v(S (B)), for each B in 13(Sn+1 x H
(n+1)). 
4, 
Intuitively, one can think of the actions in a (n+1) as being 
selected by independent date n + k strategies r
n
1  and rn
2 
+lc and the prices as 
being selected by the opinions in the usual sense. The resulting probability 
law on sequences of price - action - action triples is ;J.'. The induced measure 
v in essence represents the selection of actions that are a-convex combinations 
of the independently chosen actions in g(n+1) The convexity result states 
that the measure v is an attainable future at
n 
-32 - 
Lemma (4.3.2). If 0 < a < 1, 61. 
 = (h (n)' n 
ai ) E 6n and vi E n n ), 
i=1,2,thenfor6=86.+(1 -$)62 n and v defined in (4.3.1), v E g (6 ). 11 n n 
Proof: Let a, 6
n' 
and v , i = 1,2, be as hypothesized, and let v be 
defined as in (4.3.1). Let v n.4.k and v
n+k 









n4,k and H (n) 	
x A
nk' 
respectively, k= 1,2,.... 
(n+k) 
Also for each k let 7
n+k 
be a regular conditional distribution [5: Theorem 4.34] 




the properties of these distributions one can show by induction that 
= 
1 	* 




n)). It follows that the set 
B 	Ch (n) : (8
) 




(n+k) / < 
belongs to1B(H (n) 
k) 	 n 
) and has 1+k - measure zero. Then as in Lemma (4.4.8), 
(n+  
nk can be modified and extended to an element of 
nn+k so that the representation 
remains valid. It follows that vE gn (6n).0 
v = clnIrn+lgn+1 7Tn+2 "' (6n) 
The desired monotonicity property is more easily stated. 
Lemma (4.3.3). If 6n 
= (hai,E An' i = 1,2, and a 1 
Cal' n )- 	 n 
an  (1).Q 	(6
2









 i = 1,2, be as hypothesized, and let 
1 






































= v1 (62 s 	) 	6 = 62 s 
	Q' H
* (51 ) n+1 - n' n+1 - ' n 	n' n+1 n+1 n 
= v 	(6 s 	) 	6 0 62 . 























sn+1 ). Since 






 implies' that 
1 
vn+1 E  Hn+1' 
it follows that 
v2 ER 
n+1 	n+1' 




2 1,c ,..(n) 	1 f,1 ,(n) 
irn+k"n'"(n+k) = wn+k` un'"(n+k) / ' 






 ) n+k - n' (n+k) ' 
Since Dn.1.k does not vary with d
o 
for h (n+k) 
) fixed, we have that 7n+kE Hn+k . (n 
	
. 	* 	i For these definitions, it follows that for every sn+1 in Hn.1_1 ( 611 ), 
72 , 	72 „ 	..(62 ,s 	) = 71 a 	71 , 	..(51 S 	). Clearly n+1 'n+1 n+2 n+2 	 ' 	n+1 'n+1 n+2 n+2 ' 	n' a+1 










2 ), and since q 
n n
) (6 1 = q (6
2
), 
+1 	 - 	- 
it follows that v
1 
= v
2 . ❑ 




 , then rn_i_1 (h (n)' an ,sn.4.1 ) 	rn.4.1 (h (n) ,a
2
n ,sn+1 ) 
for each s
n+1 
E1: 2", and consequently the set of actions feasible at date n+1 
following (h (n), a
2
( n
) is at least as large as the set following (h.A) n1 ). 
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Since the feasible action sets beyond date n + 1 are unaffected by the action 
at date n, it seems intuitive that any future attainable from (h (n) ,an
1 
) would 
also be attainable from (h (;1) ,a
2
n), and this is precisely what Lemma (4.3.3) states. 
Based on this argument, one would expect a
n+1 
to be independent of the 
action taken at date n. The final result of this section states this indepen-
dence formally. 
Lemma (4.3.4). Let Sn = (h (n) ,an) be in A
n
, i = 1,2, and suppose 
s
n+1 
E int a 	 = (Si 
sn+1 
 (6i). If h (n+1) 	
), 	= 1,2, and if n n 	 '  
1 ) (ID 	Ch , then ff 	(h 1 	a 	) = 	(h 2 	a 	). an+1 E Dn+1 (h (n+1) 	n+1 (n+1) 	n+1 (n+1)' n+1 n+1 (n+1)' n+1 






), where h i 
(n+1) and an+1 
are as 
n+1 
hypothesized, i = 1,2 . Let v.1 = q 	v l 	7 1 	.(6 1 ) be in 6r 	(6 1 ). n+1 n+2
q 
 n+2 n+3 — n+1 	n+1 n+1 
For each k z 2, let 712114( (6 +1 ,-) = 71170.k (q0.1 ,•) and Tql+k (Sn+1 ,.) = 71+k (6n ,•), 
all (5n+1 * 62
n+1. 
Since Dn+k  (61 	•)= Dn+k (d2 	•) 
for k 2, it follows that n+l' n+1' 
7n+k 
 E nn+k  for k Z 2, and that v 2 = qn+1 vn+2  qn+2 vn+3 2  . .(6n+12 ) = V 1 . Since —  
the argument is symmetric in di
n+1 	n 
and  62+2'  the result follows. ❑ 
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4.4 Proof of Theorem (4.2.2)  
First note that dam -<-7" = H
(n)  x 
An by Remark (4.1.2). It remains to show 
that a restricted to A
n 
is continuous and compact valued. This will be done n 
through a series of lemmas. 






(h 	,a  ) 	((s 	h(n+1) ): a 	(h(n+1) ) E Dn+k
(h (0'
a 
 n ' sn+1'''''n+k (h(n+1))), k E 17' n (TO' n n+1' 	 n+k 
Then En (h (n) ,an) is the set of posterities at date n and history (h cnr an). 
(C.f. [29: 2.411. 




n and v E 4r (6 ). n 
Proof: The first two statements follow from Lemma (3.2.1). To prove the 








7 = m m n+1 in 
nn+1 Suppose also that (sn+1'
h(n.1)
) E supp(v) and let 
U Sn+1 H
(n+1) be an open set containing (s
n+1'
h (n+1) ). We may take 
u vl xv2 x ....xvl xv2 xs 	xH (t+1) , for some t > n+1, V
1  k open in n+1 	n+1 	 t+1 
2 1 	 n+1q(U(sn+i)pn,s114.1)> o).  Sk and Vk open in Ak , k = n+1,...,t. Let Vn4.1  = Isn+1:1T 
-1 Since v(J) > 0 , it follows that U
1
+1 




nan ) 	O. Let ;n+1 be in 
	
n 	n 
Ul 	and let V
n+1  2  = tan+1' 
• cprn+2(U(in+1' a
n+1  )1(5n' ;n+1' an+1 ) > 03. Then n+1  





22 T O.' Let 	be in U2 	Continuing n+I n+1 11 n+1
sn,, 
H 	 n+1 	n+1. 
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in this way, one constructs a sequence 
(sn+1,an+1t,at) 
 in 
V 1 	x V
n+1 
2 	x . • 	Vt x Vt such that sk is in ak_ 1 (6 11 ,...,sk_v ak_ i ) and n+1  
ak is an element of supp(Tik(6 n ,sm+1 ,...,sk)), k = n+1,...,t. For k > t, 
choose sk in 




-61-0 ;n+1"" ;k)) 
(, 
arbitrarily. Let (sn+1,hn+1)) = (s11+1'n+1' ....). Then 
(
n+1)
,Ti(n+1) ) eUrtE(S). Thus every open set containing (sn+1'
h(n+1)) con- 
n n 
tains a point of En (dn
) and (sn+1'
h




The next three results deal with specific properties of opinions and with 
essential sets of finite dimensional distributions of measures of the form 
n+1 (•) formed from feasible plans. 
Lemma (4.4.3). If 6u E H (u* x Au , there is a sequence tyg mezi of non-
empty convex and relatively compact subsets of 1R 2' such that cl Km s Km+1 for 
each m and UmEla Km = int an (6n). 
Proof: By [12: Theorem 7.2, p. 241], int a n (Sn) = UmEl4 Um, where Um 
is 
non-empty, open and relatively compact. Let Km = co Um and the result follows. ❑ 
Lemma (4.4.4). If S n 
E H (n) 
x An 
and e > 0, there is a compact set 
.K
22, and an open set U H (n) 
such that Sn 
E U x An 
and if d' E U x An' 
then K 	int a n
(8') and qn
(KIS') > 1 - e. 
Proof: By Lemma (4.4.3), there is a compact set K Q int a n (6 n
) such that 
qn
(int K16n
) > 1 - e/2. By continuity of q n




E U x An 
and if 6' E U x An
, then qn
(int Kid') > qn
(int Kid 
n






is an open set (Remark (2.3.8)), if s E K, there exists a pair 
of open sets (V,W) with V Q H (n) and W c111
22 
such that 6n
.E V x A
n
, s E W, and 
if 6' E V x A
n' 
then W int a (6'). Since the W cover K, there is a finite 
n 	 n n 
number of points s
1
,....,s
m in K and corresponding pairs (11 1 ,W1 ),...,(Vm 
 ,W ) 
such that K 	 For V = 	V H(n) is open, 6 11 E V x A11 , and 
if 6' E V xA
n' 
then K W int a (6'). Let U = unv, and the proof is n 	 n n 
complete. ❑ 
Lemma (4.4.5). If iv = {lIn}nEls1 E II , for each n in V and k z 0, if 












) = 1; 
qnwn+1 — "In+On+k+1 (Ln+k+1 (4n)16n) = 1. 
Proof: By definition, if 6 n E An , then Hn4.1 (6n) = int an (6n), and (4.4 -.6) 
for k = 0 follows from assumption (A.3)(iv). Also, if s n+I E int an (6n), then 
* 


















)q n Cdsn+1 16 
n
1 








n) = 1, 
and (4.4.7) holds for k = 0. 
Assume (4.4.6) and (4.4.7) bold for some k > 0. If (s 
n.4-1""" an+k+1 ) E 
* 
then Hn+k4.2 (6n ,sn+1 ,...,an+k+1) = int an (6n ,sn+1 ,...,an+k+1 1. Again n+k+1 (6n ) ' 
by (A.3)(iv), (4.4.7) for k implies (4.4.6) holds for k + 1. By an argm-ent 
identical to the one for k = 0, if (4.4_6) holds for k + 1, than so does (4.4.7).. 0 
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The strategy in proving that an is u.h.c. and compact valued on A n involves 
showing that In restricted to An has a closed graph and then showing that 
from n over a convergent sequence from A
n
, only tight sequences of measures can 
be selected. The result then follows from Prohorov's Theorem. 
Lemma (4.4. 8). c a. has a closed graph. 
Proof: Assume that (6
n
,y) is a point of closure of the graph of S. I Q 
8
n 
k  Then there is a sequence t(5
n' v
k 
 )3 kE74 







E .5:n (5n), and such that limO n
k 
 = an and limkv
k 
= v. For each k, let 
, k 
	of 
, 	 ,,,k, 
orr 3'r.11+1 denote an element or n
n+1 










 ...l0 ,. n la n+1 n+1 n+2 n 
Since A
n is closed, it suffices to show that there exists [ITrrn+1 in n
n+1 
 such 









For each positive integer j, let v n
1 
4j and vn+j 
denote the marginals of v for 
(n) 
H (n+j) = Sn..1.1 
x A 	x 
	
... x s 	and H (n)j) 	 An+j, 
 respectively. Also, let 
n+1 n+j 
rn4j be a regular conditional distribution for (the projection onto) An4j given 
(the projection onto) H (n)
(n+i)' 
 [5: Theorem 4.34], i.e., 7
n+j 
is a transition 
4•-• 
probability from H (nj) to' Anj 
satisfying 
v 	(B1 x B2) = f 	(B
(n)  )v1  (dh (n)  ) n+j 1 	2 	n+j 2 (n+j) n+j 	(n+j) ' 
B
1 
for an B1 in 113(11((:1 )41) ) and B2 in 13(A1141 ). 
By continuity of projections, k  (6 n
k 
) -Pv _implies that for each j, 
k 	k 	 f ,k 	1 	 k 	 k 	k 
qn7n+1 ...7n+j _lqn+j-lvun
,.‘ -
, vn4j and q nTrn+1  ...q n+j-lirn+f fu.tn' -. vn+j 
 . Using 
these results and the above formula for vn+j it can be shown by a straightforward 
-39 - 










for each j (here the product measures are 
vn+j = cin iTn+l—qn+j-l itn+j Un ),  
formed using qn (8d,qn4.1 (8 n ,4),..., and [2: Theorem 2.7.2]). 
Wenowusetheconditionaldistributionsrntj to construct the desired 








x H 	 and (s 	
' 	) E U, th
e n in (8
n
) --Pv implies that 
lim 
—k m
k (18k) v(U) > 0. It then follows by a straightforward argument that 
n 
supp(v) 	Li(supp(mk  (811k ))), where "Li" denotes topological limit inferior 





))) C En (8n). For each j, let 
B. = [h(n) : (8,h (71j)
) E dom D 	,r 	(D 	(8 ,h (n) )111 (n) ) < 1]. Then (n+j) 	n n+1 n+j n+j n (n+j) 	(n+j) 
(n) 
B. E1B(H(n+j)) and it follows that v
1 











) n+ 3 
to be 7 .(h (n) . if 8' = 8 and h
(n)
. E Bc , and to be 7(6 ,h (:) otherwise. n+3 (n+3) 	n 	n 	(n+3) 	j 	
n,
71-j 	+j  
 Then clearly rn4j so extended belongs to lin+j , and it is easily verified that 
= clniTn+lqn+11rn+2' • (8n ) ' D  
Theorem (4.4. 9). sr is u.h.c. and compact valued on A
n . 









each k. Let trk 3 n+1 	 n be an element of H











) 17 qnrni.lqn_Fi nn+2 ...(8n). By Lemma ( 4,4.8) and [20: Theorem 1, p.24], 
the theorem will be proved if it can be shown that (mk(8
k
)]kEiti 	 0 
has a convergent 
n  
subsequence. To do this, we show that this sequence is tight. 
Let e >0 be given. By Lemma (4.4.4 ), there is a positive integer k
0 
 and 
a compact set K 0  such that for k z k0
, K 
0 






 18k)> 1 - E2-1 . 
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Also, by Lemma (4.4. 3), for k = 	 1, there is a compact set K o such that 
K
o 










' and  
qn (Kko ldn
k 
 ) > 1 - E2
-1 
 . For k z k o let Ko
k 
 = Ko, and let 




 and JIk  = ((str41 ,an41): sn4.1 Ko ,an+1 E 
k 
and JI = UkzoJi . Then T1 	* Q H11+1 ,T1 is let T1 = liczoT1 
closed, and since T1 JO x L1 , T1 is compact, where JO  = (6 1:14cz0 . By Theorem 
(3.2.3), Dn+1(T1)  and J
k , for each k, are compact. Thus J
1 
 is measurable and 
1  
for each k z 1, q 	IdkN 	rk fJk ak‘ = 	fKk idic't > 1 - e2-1 . Let 
	
n n+1` 1 1 n i 'n n.41` 1 1 n 1 4n‘ 0 1 n 1 
, 
ji = Liczo tdn
k
i x Ji . One can verify that .7 1 is closed, and since 
ji 	JO x L1 x Drri.1 (T1 ), .11 is compact. 
The proof now proceeds by induction. Suppose that for sime integer r > 1, 
* 
there exist compact sets j
r-1 
 Q 
An+r-1' L r QIR++' 
2t 
and Tr :Q 
Hn+r, 
 and for every 
(a
) r.k, k z 0, there is a compact set Jrk  such that ) 
t° 11 i x jr ,lk An+r' 











 .I 	xLr x-Dn+r (Tr )  andj
r 
 is compact. 
n' 	r  
By Lemma ( 4.4.4), if 61:14r E H (n+r) x kn+r , there is a compact set 
K
22. 
and an open set U H (n+r) such that dtrfr EU x Alrfr and if ISni +rEU x. An+r , 
then K Q int a
n+r 
(6' +r ) and qn+rn 
 (K16'+r  ) > 1 - c2 r-1 . Since H(n+r) 
is locally 
compact [1±: Theorem 6.5(4), p.239], we may assume that cl U is compact and that 
these properties hold with U replaced by cl U. The u cover J r , which is compact 
by hypothesis (c). Then there is a finite set [(5 n 	i = 1,..„i 	jr and 
correspondingopensetsU i andcompactsetsK.,i = 	
.* 
, with Q U. U r 	1=1. i 
Let Lr+1 	i = Iji*=1  K., and define, for k z 0%, the sets 
(n) Tik = ((h r+1 	'(u+r)' -A n+r' -
s 
n+r+1 ): 
(n1 	 (n) 






f(h (n) 	a 	: h (n) 
	ik 	 k 	(n) 
r+1 	(n+r+1)' n+r+1 ) 	(n+r+1) E Tr+1' an+r+1 E Dn+r+1 ( 611.1 h (n+r+1) ) 
-41- 










= (611 3 x T 	and let Tr+1  4 Tk and r+1' 	 r+1 	z0 r+1 
=Jk 
jr+1 Ukz0 r+1 . 
- 	 - 
It is easily verified that Tr
k 
 +1 
is closed, and since Tr
k 














x Lr.t.1, and hence by (c), T
r+1 
is compact. Finally, by construction 
Tr+1 	Hn+r+1 .. By Theorem (3.2.3), Dni,11 (Tri.1 ) and Jr+ 	each k z 0, are 
compact. Thus Jr+i is measurable and for each k 




k 	 ITk i xlc \ 
n n+1 	n+T n+T n+r+1 r n n
7 
 n+1 —7n+rqn+r/rn+T+1‘- r+1 1 'n / 
^k 	k 
=(T Id clarn+1 	wn+Tqn+T r+1 n) 
	
k 	k 	k i ,k, (1 - E2-r-1 )
qn7n+17n+r 
,
r 10n ) 
,> (1 - E2-r-1 )(1 - r )... (1 - £2-1 ), 
where the last inequality follows from (b) of the induction hypothesis. Let 
jr+1 = UkO tSkn..1i 






(Tr+1), it follows that J
r+1 
is compact. 
The induction hypothesis thus holds for r + 1 and hence for every r in 1N. 
Note that by definition of Jr, the set Jr 
is compact and 
for each r. The set J 	Ejxs 	x (n+r+I) 
jr+1 	jr x Lr+I x Dn+r+I (T r+1 ) " 	 (r) r 	n+r+I 
is thus closed in Sn+1 
x 
H(n+1) and J(r+1) c J(r). Thus, J 	nirEMi J (r)  is 






Dn+2(T2)  x ..., implying that J is compact. 
But for k 	1, 









= lim q 7
k 	
..q 	7k (Jr r n n+1 . n+r-l'n+r r n 
- 	 - 
z limr (1 - c2-r )(1. - £2 	1) *** (1 - E2-1) 
-42-- 
1 - lim E
r 
 e2 r i=1 
= 1 - e. 
Since e was arbitrary, the sequence Cm
k k
n
)3kEIT is tight. By Prohorov's 
k Theorem [4: Theorem 6.1], Cmk (6nljkE1m is relatively compact, and the proof 
is complete. ❑ 
As in [23: 5.3 - 5.7], the strategy in proving that in is 1.h.c. on A n 
 involves showing that in is generated by continuous selections. Here, however, 
continuity of selections is limited by the restricted continuity of D n . 
Lemma (4.4.10). If e > 0, irirE IIn , and v.E 9(H (n) ) with v(Hn) = 1, then 
there exists rn in n such that n 
 1 is continuous and for every bounded 
n 









<2e HO, where 




A 3. n  
Proof: Let e, .r 
n
, and v be as hypothesized. By Lemma (A.ILI), there is a 
closed set B' g H
(n) 
such that v(B') > 1 - e and 
7nIB' 
is continuous. For 
B = n
, B is a closed subset of H
n

























can be extended to a continuous selection ir
n for DOn I H* . Let 
* 	* 	* 	 * 	 * n 	* 
7n = iin on Hn and 7n = 7u , otherwise. Since Hn.E1S(S (n) ), 7n E II and 7 I * is n Hn 
zontinuous. 
-43- 
Finally, if g: H
CaX 
 x A l -1R is bounded and continuous, then 
n 	
- fgdwril l =
n 	
- jgdvirn i 
	
Bc xAn Bc xA 
s 211 gll v (Bc ) < 211 gll e, 
where B
c 
is the complement in H (n) of B.0 




 It ,7 
n 
I H  * is continuous), n 	n n 
and let *n = (11
-n 
= (7m )mmE m'mZn). Analogous to (4.2.1), let 
* : H (n) x A
n 
=4 ,e(Sn41 x 
H(n+1)) 
 be defined by n  
iti (h(n) , an) = (1.) E e(sn+i x H(n+1)) : v 
n+101 	a ) n+1E *n+1 ). (n) u 
* 	 * 
By Lemma (4.4.10 ),
n 
p for each n, and consequently dom a = H
(n) x An . 
The next result shows that i* is dense in g on a
n . 
Lemma ( 4.4.12). If 60 An, then J-11 (6n) = cl 4011). 
Proof: By Theorem ( 4.4.9), if a n E An , then ol en (6n) J;(6n). Suppose 
then that vE 5(611), v ...(611), where rioit E 11114,k , each k. " -117rn+lqn+171U+2 
(n) 	 Ca) 
Let vn+k 
denote the marginal of v for H
(n 
i.e., if &EVE(n+k)), then 
1 (B) = cinmn+l—qn+k -1(BI 6n). Let an be the element of 
at dn , i.e., t.ri ((8 n )) = 1. If B E/3(H 	), then Z vi (n+k) 	n n+1 
n
v(B x H (n+k) ). In particular, by (4.4.6), an vin+k (Hn+k* ) - 
(H (n) x. An) degenerate 
(B) = vn+k (B(6n)) = 
1 	* 
" vn+k (Bh+k (611)) " 1. 
* 
Let e > 0 be given. By Lemma ( 4.4.10), for each k there exists .1: n4.1( in 
* +k 	
* 	 * 	 * c n n and a closed subset Bn+k-Q  Hn..i.k such that 1-n.4.k = ITn4.1c. on Bn4.1c U Hn .1.k and 
1 









. Then B E 13(H), v(B(sS
n
)) > 1 - e, and if 
-44 - 
( 
B' ElB(Sn+1 x H n+1 -) ) with B' . c B(6 ), then v(W) = v (B'). But then if - n 
(n+1) 	 • 	* is bounded and continuous, then ISgdv - Jgdv Is 2141v(B(6
n
) c ) < g : Sn+1 H   
21Igfle. Since e was arbitrary and v E .111 (6n), it follows that every basic 




 n 	 n 
), g and hence v E cl 	(6 n- ).0 
If rn+1 .E
*n+1 , then qwn+1 is a selection for * and hence also for g. 
These selections are continuous on A
n . 






= 	 n 	. Since An and 4)(Sn4.1 xH(nI)) 
are metrizable, sequential convergence determines continuity. By an argument 
similar to [4: p.30], it suffices to show that the finite dimensional distributions 
of qrn+1 are continuous on A
n
. 









g(6n' sn+1 ) = f (s 	' a 	)71. 	(da 	16 s 	1. n+1 n+1 n+1 n+1 n' n+1 
Ah+1 
Then g is bounded and measurable and by the usual mapping theorems 
[4: Theorems 5.4, 5.5], gi ll* 	is continuous since r n+1 1,1* 	is. Let C 5nikEll An 
n+1 T11+1 




E int a 0 ) and isn ...1 	C Sn+1 with lim_s
k 
= s° 	then 
n+1 	n n - 	 it n+I 	n+1' 
limkgk (snk  +1 ) = g o(sn0 41). For by Lemma ( 4.4.4) and its proof, there is an open 
set K s int a (6
0 
 ) with compact closure and an open set V c A
n 
such that n n 
-45- 
0 0 (6n' sn4.1
) E V x K, and if 6
n
.E V, then K int a
n 




,sn+1k )EVxK,  Hn+1' 
and the claimed convergence follows. By 
the uniform boundedness of (7,..)
kE 	
and [4: Theorems 5.4, 5.5], it follows that 
IN 
limkfgdgn7n+1 (on ) = SgdghlTn+1 (6n
0 
) and thus that 
limkqnvn4.1 (an) = qn7n4.1 (dn
0 
). Hence, qn-rin41 is continuous on A n . 
By way of induction, suppose 
(Innn+l—qn+k-17n+k 
 is continuous on A
n 
for 
some k > 1. By essentially the same arguments as above, one can show that 
is continuous on A , that qn+k rn+k+1 is continuous on An+k , qn7rn+l —Trn+kqn+k  
and finally that qnlin+3. ...qn+on+k±i is continuous on A
n
.0 
Lower hemi-continuity of g is now easy. 









* 	 0 	 k 









k 	 0 	 a limkdk = an 
0
, and suppose v.E 6
* 
 n(6n), v = q7
n+1 
 (6n) for some 7rn+1 in II
*n+1
. 
Then for each k z 1, irn+1 k 
	* k 
q 	(6 n g ) E 	(6
n 
 ), and by Lemma (4.4. 13), 
n  
n+1 k 	n+1 0 * 





Theorems (4.4. 9) and (4t.4. 14) complete the proof of Theorem (4.2.2). 
-46-- 
5. Intertemporal Choice 
5.1. Derived Utility and Demand 
Definition (5.1.1). For each positive integer n, let 
C1)





x x 49(s 	x H 
n+1 
u (11 (11) , an , v) = ju(projc 	n (h ,a ,s 	h
(4+1) ))v(d(s
n ,h(A+1))). n ) n n+1' 	 1 
Then un (h (n) ,an ,v) gives the agent's expected utility at date n when the 
future is governed by V and experience to date is (h (ni on). It is clear from 
(A.2) that u
n 
is bounded and continuous in the product topology. 
Definitions (5.1.21. The agent's derived utility function yn at date n 

























Associated with this supremum is the set of measures that attain it: 
fin : 
	n 






) = (v: vE g
n 
 (h
(n) , a n' ) v n (h(n), a n
) = un (h (n), an ,v) • 
Lemma (5.1.3). v
n 
is defined and bounded on H
Cai 
 x An,  v
nIA 





A  is non-empty, compact valued and u.h.c. 
a 
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem (4.2.2) and [',0: Corollary, 9.30.:7 
Remarks (5.1.4). Since we are not interested in the values of v n 
off On , 
but it would be convenient to have v
n 
bounded and continuous on all of H 	, x ..- 
(n) n' 











By Lemma (3.2.1), the existence of such an extension is suaranteed. 
(c.f. [12: Theorem 5.1, p.149]). We fix one such extension and refer to it 
as vn throughout the sequel. 
The first stage of the two stage optimization process mentioned in 
Section 3.2 is depicted in (5.1.2). It consists of choosing a best attainable 
future at each date. The second stage consists of choosing a best current 
action that is feasible, where "best" refers to the derived utility function v n . 

















.E Dn(h(n))). The function v
n 
is analogous 







is then given by 








I ri* is continuous, and 
dn 1 H
* is non-empty, compact valued, and u.h.c. 
Proof: Follows directly from Theorems (3.2.3) and (3.2.6), Lemmas (3.2.8) 
and (5.1.3), and [20: Corollary, p.30]. 0 
5.2. Optimal Plans- 
An agent's intertemporal choice behavior, as- depicted in (5.1.2) and (5.1.51, 
is consistent if it is equivalent to following an optimal plan, i.e., a solution 
to the problem (4.1.4). Such a solution is constructed here from measurable 






Lemma (5.2.1). There exists a transition probability mn : 	ton(Sn4l x H (n4.1) ': 
such that (i) mn(6n)Enn); (ii) mn 
is 1B(Ln )1113(t?(Sn+1 x H
(n+1)









), for every B inl8(S n+1 ). 
Proof: The existence of m
n 
satisfying (i) and (ii) follows from Lemma (5.1.1 
and  [13: Theorem 1]. By (ii) and Lemma (A.II), m
n 
is a transition 




, there exists a date n+1 feasible plan 








and (iii) follows.0 
Remarks ._(5.2.2). In general, the n+1 in the last sentence of the above 








mn itself need not be the tail of an optimal plan. Even if m n 













 and this held for 
every n, there is no guarantee in general that r il+1 would be the tail of n
n 
for every n. This is the essence of the existence question. 
Lemma (5.2.3). There exists a function w
n
: 
nn (h (n) )E Dn (h (n) ),V h (n) E dom Dn












such that (i) 
E dn (h (n) ),v h (n) E Hn ; 
for any h
(n) 










 satisfying (i) - (iii) such 
(n) 	 n  
that n
o
n (h Vin) 
 1 = an . 










)-measurable and that selects from d * Let 
n Hn 







and let 7n 
= 0 (the zero vector in Y.- ) on the complement of 
* 	 * 	 * 
H (n) (in H (n) ). Since HEIES(1 (11) ) and 0. E Dn (h (n) ) for all h (n) in dam Dn , 7 1.1 
satisfies (i) - (iii). The second statement of the Lemma follows from the fact 
that Tr
n 
can be modified on any singleton subset of H
n in the desired manner, 
preserving CO - 
-49- 
Conventions (5.2.4). The need to modify selectors ford n 
for 
particular histories and actions and still have a measurable selection stems 
from the fact that equilibrium actions must be capable of being chosen by 
* 
agents following feasible strategies. We identify any function 7.11. satisfying 
(5.2.3) (i) - (iii) with the transition probability degenerate at the values of 
* *
nn. Tqith this identification it is clear that Tr n E nn . For any sequence of 
* 	 * 
711' 
x H(n+1))  by such functions f 1nEN'  define mn : H (n) x An -..g(Sn+1 -  














n+1Trn4-2 ••• (h (n) ,an). Then mn is a transition probability 
[2: Theorem 2.7.2] and hence a measurable selection for an (Lemma A.II). It 
. * 
will follow from the next theorem that m
n 





proving this result it is convenient to have the selections mn of Lemma (5.2.1) 
defined on all of 
H(n)n. 










is defined above. Henceforth, we assume the m
n 
of 
(5.2.1) are extended in this fashion. 
Theorem (5.2.5). If 
inn}nEIN 
is a sequence each component of which satis-
fies Lemma (5.2.3) (i) - (iii), then for each n in IN and 6 n in An , 
(5.2.6) 
	



























(d (sn+1  , an+1 )16n) • 
An+1 (6n ) 




. By Lemma (5.1.6) the first integral 











-)) on Hn+1(6n). The last equality in (5.2.6) then follows 
-5 0 - 
from (4.4.6) and (4.4.7) 
n+1„ To prove the first two equalities, let v be in if (6n ), 	0 /, v = n ), 
	
n+1 	f 1 some Tr = L ITInjmn.1.1 in H
n+1
. It follows from (5.1.2) and (5.1.5) and 
from (4.4.6) and (4.4.7) that 
un (6n
,v)s fy 	(6 s 	a 	)q 	(d(s 	a 	)16 ) 





and for every sni.1 in H (n4a) n), that 







Integrating on both sides of this last inequality with respect to qn (6n) and 
using the last equality of (5.2.6) gives that 
un (6n,y) s 	(d s 	a 	)q
* 
(d(s 	a 	)16 ). n+1 n' n+1' n+1 n n+1 	n+1' n+1 n 
n+1n ) 
Since v was arbitrary and m
n (6n)E "6- (6 ), we conclude that n n 
(*) un (5n ,mn (611 )) s vn (5n) s vn+1 (5n ,sn+1 ,an4.1 )qnli:44 (d(sn+1 ,an+1 )13n ). 
n+1 (5n ) 
be a sequence of functions satisfying Lemma (5.2.1) (extended as Let (mn+kkz0 






) and for each k inN, let 
* 	 * 
"n+k qn7n+l —qn+k7n+kmn+k (6n ) (recall that mn+k is a transition probability =  
x -  and use [2: Theorem 2.7.211). Then n+k 	mn (5n) in g(s71+1 	
H(n+1) ) since-the 
-51- 
* 
dimensional distributions of X n+k  converge to those of mn 
6
n
) (c.f. [4: p.30]). 
Also for each k = 0,1,..., define 

























). Similarly, for k > 0 and tE 









wn+k - vn+k (6n' t)(1n7rn+1 	qn+k-1n+k (dt16n). 
An+k (6n ) 
It follows from this representation and 0'9 that w
n 
s wn4.1 . Using this represen-















v 	,s 	a 	)q r* (d(s 	a 	)16 ) n+1 n n+1' n+1 n n+1 	n+1' n+1 n 
A














Thus equality holds throughout, proving (5.2.6). ❑ 
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Remarks (5.2.7). Equation (5.2.6) is an optimality type equation for 
the problem (4.1.4). The second equality in (5.2.6) produces a version of the 
optimality criterion for non-stationary dynamic programming [24: (5.1)]. 
Existence of optimal non-randomized plans follows easily from this result. 
Theorem (5.2.8). If 7 = [IT
n
3nE la is any sequence of functions each 
component of which satisfies Lemma (5.2.3) (i) - (iii), then 7 E n and if 
ITE n and h (1) E Hl , then 
fu(proj e(h (1) ))Trq(dh (1) 1h (i) ) s ja(prok(h (1) ))7r *q(dh.(1) 1h (1) ). H(1) 	 H(1) 
Proof : Apply (5.2.6) for n = 1. ❑ 
Remark (5.2.9). Any sequence it =
n
nE2,1 as hypothesized in Theorem 
(5.2.8) solves the problem (4.1.4). The interpretation of the components of 
such a plan as demand functions derives from the optimality of this plan. 
Similarly, the interpretation of do as the agent's demand relation derives from 




is irrelevant so long as 




since, as will be demonstrated in the next section 
(Theorem (5.3.5)), d
o 
is empty valued off Q. 
5.3. Concavity and Monotonicity  
The concavity and monotonicity of u assumed in (A.2) is preserved to some 
extent in the derived utility function vn . The concavity result is due to 
Jordan [21: Proposition 2.33]. 
-53- 














then dn(h(n)) is convex. 
Proof: Suppose h (n) E dom Dn and an E Dn (h (n) ) ' 
i = 1,2. 
Then d i = (h(n), a i ) E An 
and there exists vE 
n (6), 	= 1,2, (Lemma (5.1.3)). n 	n 
If 0 < 	< 1, let13
n 
0, and v be as in (4.3.1). For 
6
n 
= 6d1 + (1 - 6)6
2
, vE 6. (6 ) by Lemma (4.3.2). Thus 
n n 
vn (Sn) z un
(6,v) 




z fu(proj C(6111'sn+l'an+1•)) 
















n ) + (1 - 6).vn(6
2
n). 
If h (n) E Ha , the convexity of Dn (h (11) ) and concavity of vn (h (n.) ,.) imply that 
dn (h (n)
) is convex.0 
The monotonicity result is the analog here of [18: Lemma 3.4(iii)]. 
Though the result is standard, as in the case of Lemma (5.3.1), the context 
is not and a proof is required. 
-54- 
Lemma (5.3.2). If h 	E dom D
n 
and a1 E D (h 	), i = 1,2, and if 
	
Cu) n 	n (n) 
2 an
1 
 s an, then vn (h (n) ,an1  ) ‹. vn (h (n) ,an). 
1 2 Proof: Let h
(n) ,an ,an be as hypothesized and let sn = (h (n) ,an
), i = r ; 2. 
By Lemma (4.3.3), g
n
(o1n ) 	an (5 2
). Thus for v 1E ;n (6n), 
vn(5 1 ) 	nr1(5 1 ,v 1 ) 
r 





s vn (6 2n). 
If a1 = (c,f) and c1  s c2 , then the first inequality is strict. Thus n n 	n - 
v(h
(n)' -) is non-decreasing on D (h ) and strictly increasing in c n . n n (n) 
By Lemma (4.3.4), vn+1 (5
I ,an+1 ,an.4.1 ) s vn+1 C6 n ,sn+1 ,an+1 1, for every 
sn+1 in Hn+1 n  (6
1) = H*n+1 (6n
2) and every an+1 in Dn+1 (6n'
1 
sn+1 )nDn+1 (6n
2 ,sn+1 ). 
1 	 2 Since a1 s a
n
2 
 , it follows that if 
sn+1n  E 
 H*
+I 







n+1 ) 	Dn+1 (6n'
s
m - n 	 n  
1 	 9 and Dn+1 (6" ' sn+1 ) + (f2 
2 
- fn , 0) Q Dn+1 (6n'
2 s
n+1 	 n 
)• Assume that f 1 s fn , and let n  
r
n+1 satisfy Lemma (5.2.3) (i) - (iii). It follows from the strict monotonicity 
of vnl_1 (6n ,sn+1 ,.) in c
n+1 and the results just derived that 
1 f , 
(A s 	 * v n+1 	n+1' 7n+1`'un' sn+1 )) < vn+1 (6'n' sn 	n+1 (u n' sn+1 )) ' 




). From this inequality and (5.2.6) we have that 
-55- 
















(6 2 ).0 
Corollary (5.3.3). If h (n5 E H, then E(h (n) ).d(h (n) ) =r(h (n) ) • 
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas (5.1.6) and (5.3.2). ❑ 
The next result is the analog here of [18: Theorem 3.5] and will be needed 
in [29]. 
k 	 * 	 0 	0 
Lemma (5.3.4). Let (11, 11 ,1
kEN 
 Q Hn with h (
k 
 n) --. h (n) , some h (n) in H (n) . 




 E dn (h (
k 
 n) ), for each k in 71■7, and an
k 








Proof: Follows from Lemmas (3,2.1) amd (5.1.3) essentially as in 
[18: Theorem 3.5].0 
Theorem (3.2.2) states that the feasible action relation is unbounded at 
any history h (n) in dam Dn for which yh (n) ) Qn (Z 1 (h (n) ),..., n_ 1 (h (n) )). 
This result, however, does not preclude Dn (h (n) ) from being unbounded only in 




being non-empty at boundary points h
(n) of Hn . This possibility is cleared up 
-56- 
in our final result which makes the analogy with Green's fundamental characteri-
nation [18: Theorem 2.12 complete. 
Theorem (5.3.5). If h (n) E dom Dn but E n (h (n) ) f Qn (yh (n)),...,,n_1 (h (n) )), 
then vn (h (n) ) >vn (h (n) ,an) for all an in Dn (h (n) ). 
Proof: Let h (n) be as hypothesized. If Cn
1 
(h (n) ) 	0, the result follows 
from Lemma (5.3.2). Therefore assume En
1 (h (n) ) > 0. As in the proof of 
Theorem (3.2.2), there exists a vector y in E'cL , y 0 0, such that 2 (h 	' 	= 0 En (n) ).Y 
and x•y z (>) 0 for all x in r'(int r'), where r' is defined in the proof of 
Theorem (3.2.2). Thus, in particular, if sn+l E an (h (n) ,.)(int om (h (n),-)), 
then En1 
+1 (sn+1 ) E r 
Let in = (Cn ,?n) be in Dn (h (n) ) and suppose by way of contradiction that 
vn (h (n) ) = vn (h (n) ,an). Let an = (Cn ,'En) be such that en = Cn and ?la = 	y. 
It is easily verified that an E Dn(h(n)). Let an =(n),an) and 3n = (h (n)' ). 
Then H* (6 ) 	H* 	) = int a(6) = int a(Ci)
' 
and if s 	E H* a ) then 
n n 	n n n+1 n n+1 n 	 n+1 n+1 n 
Dn+1 (8n' sntl ) Dn+1n ,snI ) 	In particular, if an+1 E Dn+1n' sn41 ) ' then 
s 	 < s
n+1n'wn+2). 
Since En = Zn , it follows from 
Lemma (4.3.4) that for every an+1 EDn+1 (6n ,sn+1), vn+1 (an ,sn+1 ,an+1 ) = 
vn+1 (5,sn+1' an+1 
But by the above strict inequality in the budget constraint, Lemma (5.3.2) 
implies that 
* 
vn+l (° n, sn+l ) = max(v 	,s 	a 	): a 	E D 	s 	)3 n+1 n n+1' n+1 n+1 n+1 n' n+1 
= max (v
n+1n' sn+1'
an+1 ): an+1 E Dn+1 
<max(vn+1n' sn+1' an+1 ): an+1 E D  
* 
= v
n+1 (6 n ,sn+1). 
(3 n' sn+1 )1 
n ,sn+1 )3 
'(int r') and ;14.1 (sn+1 ).y 	0. 
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n+1 )q(dsn+1 I Sn ) 












a contradiction.. ❑ 
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6. Conclusion 
This concludes the first part of a competitive analysis of a sequential 
exchange model with spot trading and unconditional futures contracting. The ). 
consistency and continuity of agent choice have been established in the absence 
of institutional arrangements for handling bankruptcy. These results are 
employed in the second part of this analysis [29] concerned with the existence 
"r•-• 
of temporary competitive equilibria. 
APPENDIX 
The results collected in this appendix are used in the text. They are 
variants of or similar to published results, but they require proof or annotated 
,references. 
Lemma (A.I). Let r and s be positive integers, B c la r , and 
rs 
B =g with 0 ¢ dom 4  a B. If (i) the graph of is closed in B 
(ii) 0 is convex valued, and (iii) there exists y in g such that y E 0(x) for 
each x in dom 0, then is u.h.c. at each x in dom where 0(x) is compact. 
Q 
Proof: Let R be in dam and assume that 0(R) is compact. Let y be such 
that (x,Y)E graph 0, for all x in dom 0. By (i), if y Eg but y 44)(x), there 
exists sets V dom and U. such that V is open in dom $ and R E V, U is 
open in g, y E U, and 0(V) if (the complement of U) 	(b), p.24]. 
"10 
Let e > 0 be given and let D = (y: r Ems", d(7,0( 1) = el, where 
d(y,0(R)) = 	- y'H: y r E 0(;)]. Then D is compact and clearly 
Dr10(R)= 0. Thus for each y in D there is a pair of open sets (V,u) with the 
properties mentioned above. Since the U cover D, there is a finite number of 
points yi ,...,yk in D and corresponding pairSiof open sets (V 1 ,111 ),...,(7k ,Uk ) 
such that D 	 U. For V 	 V a dom 0, V is open in dom 0, and 
x E V. Also U is open in e and 0(V) G Uc Dc . 
Let D = ty: d(Y,(1)(x)) < el and let D+ = (y: d(37,060) > c). Then 
Dc = D U D
+
, 0(x) 	D , and if x E V, then by (ii) either $(x) 	D or 
0(x) a D+. But y E 0(R) 	D- and y E 0(x) for all x in V. This implies that 
0(x) 	D for all x in V, and hence 	is u.h.c. at Tt L20: p.22:1.0 
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Lemma 	Let (X,13) be a measurable spi and Y a metric space. 
Tf 0: X -- e(Y) is 13413(Y)) - measurable, then 	is a transition probability. 
Conversely, if is a transition probability from X to Y and .9(Y) is second 
countable, then 0: X --9(Y) isE4B09(Y))- measurable. 
Proof: The basic results along this line are [11: Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 . 
Indeed, according to [11: Theorem 2.1], if W is the a-algebra of subsets of 
9(Y) generated by the mappings v -'v(B), B inIB(Y), then 0 is1B/W - measurable 
if and only if 	is a transition probability. In [II: Theorem 3.1], the 
equality of W and1B(6(Y)) is asserted for Y a compact metric space. Since Y 
is then separable, which is equivalent to .9(Y) being second countable 
[4: p.239], this is a special case of the lemma. The coincidence of W with 
13(9(Y)) when (T,B(Y)) is a standard Borel space is established in E34: Lemma 6.1: 
but the proof uses only the fact that 9(Y) has a countable base. CI 
Lemma (A.III). Let X be a topological space and Y a separable metric 
space. If v is a regular probability measure on1B(X) ([2: 7.3.1]) and if o is 
a transition probability from X to Y, then for every c > 0 there is a closed 
set B 	X with v(B) > 1 - e such that OI B :B -.10':;(Y) is continuous. 
Proof: This is a generalization of Lusin's theorem [2: 4.3.17(b)]. A 
proof when X is a metric space is given in [23: Lemma 5.4]. The general case 
of the lemma follows from Lemma (A.II) and [37: Theorem 3.1(b), p.35:. 
Lemma (A.T7). Let X and Y be metric spaces and let 05: X = y. Define 
Y:X rie'(_f). by y(x) = (v: vE 	 0(x)). 	Then dom ¢ = dom y. 
-61- 
If B 	dom 0 and 01 13 is u.h.c. and compact valued, then -d B is u.h.c. and com- 
pact valued. If Y is separable and complete and 01 B is continuous and compact 
valued, then yi B is continuous and compact valued. If Y is a Hilbert space 
and 01 33 is l.h.c. with closed convex values, the y1 B is l.h.c. with closed 
convex values. 
Proof: The first conclusion is clear. The proof in [23: Lemma 5.5] can 
be relativised to B dom 0 to obtain the second and third conclusions. If 
Y is a Hilbert space, the relation un defined in the proof of [23: Lemma 5.5] 
can be shown to be a continuous function if 0I B has closed convex values. The 
remainder of this proof then goes through.0 
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5. All spaces X in this paper for which the topology of weak convergence for 
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6. The extension of the model here to futures contracts with varying but bounded 
contract length appears feasible though complicated. Such an extensior is of 
interest in developing a term structure of futures contracts but is beyond the 
scope of this analysis. 
7. Throughout, when the range of integration is unspecified, it is understood to 
be the whole space in question, in this case C. 
8. The notation "cl" and "int" denote closure and interior relative to the ambi-
ent factor space of H in which the set lies. In the case in (2.3.2) this 
space is Sn+1
( = IR), which is equivalent to taking the closure in 2- sine 
Q
2 is closed in P.22 . The relative interior of a convex set is denoted by "-i. 
9. The well known and ongoing controversy over whether or not futures - prices are 
or should be unbiased estimates of spot prices is at the heart of theories of 
speculation and hedging [7, 17]. There is also a growing literature on the so 
called "martingale" or unbiasedness property of asset prices in the rational 
expectations setting that indicates that this property need not and in general 
will not hold in such equilibria [26]. 
10. C.F. Definition (4.4.1). The term "posterity" is borrowed from [38: p. 9683. 
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TEMPORARY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN A 
SEQUENCE OF SPOT AND FUTURES MARKETS
1 
By David C. Nachman 
This is the second part of a competitive analysis of 
an exchange economy with a sequence of spot and 
(unconditional) futures markets begun in [8]. It 
is shown that commonness and compatibility assump-
tions regarding agents' opinions, along with the 
"consistency" assumptions of [8], imply a specific 
support structure of these opinions. This structure 
implies that for particular price-action histories 
at a given market date individual and aggregate 
demand for futures contracts are bounded below by 
resources at the subsequent date. Existence of a 
sequence of temporary equilibria and an equilibrium 
path for the economy follow in a routine fashion. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on the equilibrium 
analysis of incomplete market economies [11] with particular emphasis on 
temporary equilibria in economies that evolve in time [4]. This paper is the 
second part of a competitive analysis of an exchange economy where markets are 
open at each of an infinite sequence of dates for spot trading and limited 
unconditional futures contracting, and where agents at each date are uncertain 
only about prices that will prevail at future dates. The model is an extension 
of a two period one developed by Green [5]. The problem concerns the viability 
of a purely competitive exchange mechanism in this context of sequential trading 
with no institutional arrangements for handling bankruptcy. The burden of 
avoiding bankruptcy falls on agents' probabilistic opinions (expectations) re- 
garding future prices, and these opinions become the focal point of the analysis. 
The first part of this analysis, carried out in [8], deals with the 
consistency and continuity of individual agent choice at each market date and 
over the infinite horizon. Under more or less standard assumptions on pre-
ferences and endowments it is shown that if an agent's opinions regarding prices 
are consistent in an appropriate sense, then the agent's choice behavior is cot. 
sistent and demand is upper hemi-continuous, compact and convex valued for 
appropriate price-action histories and exhibits desired behavior on the 
boundary of this set of histories [8: Section 5]. In particular, an extension 
of Green's fundamental result [5: Theorem 2.1] is obtained that characterizes, 
for each date and history at that date, the current prices at which current 
demand is well defined [8: Theorems :,3.2.2) and (5.3.5)]. 
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The second part of this analysis, carried out in this paper, deals with 
the consistency in the aggregate sense, of individually optimal sequential choice 
decentralized through the price mechanism at each market date. The objective 
is to establish the existence of a sequence of temporary competitive equilibria 
and an equilibrium path for an economy populated by agents as described in [8]. 
The usual existence arguments require that aggregate demand exhibit 
appropriate behavior over approaches to the boundary of the set of admissible 
prices (c.f. [4: Section 3.1]). Complications arise in deducing this behavior 
in a perfectly competitive model of exchange with futues markets where there 
are no a priori bounds on the size of futures contracts.
2 
Green [5] shows that 
one can avoid imposing such bounds, which institutionally augment the competitive 
mechanism, provided agents' opinions about prices exhibit some degree of common-
ness. The perfectly competitive mechanism is thus preserved and the class of 
environments in which it operates effectively (allocates resources) is more 
clearly delineated. 
In this paper, two assumptions are made concerning agents' opinions that 
ensure the existence of certain common price forecasts.
3 
The first is necessary 
for aggregate demand to be well defined and is analogous to [5: (4.1)]. The 
second assumption concerns common price forecasts, say at date n for date n + 1, 
whose futures price component is a common spot price forecast for date n + 2. 
This assumption can be viewed as a dynamic analog of Green's commonness assump-
tion [5: (4.2)]. 
A third assumption is made on the aggregate of agent's opinions that has no 
counterpart in [5] where existence of equilibrium for markets beyond the initial 
date is not considered. In the present model, the set of histories where aggre-
gate demand for date n, n > 1, is well behaved (upper hemi-continuous) may be 
smaller than the set of admissible prices, where aggregate demand is well defined. 
A compatibility assumption on agents' opinions is made to obtain a set suitable 
for application of a market equilibrium theorem. 
These three assumptions, together with the consistency assumptions of [8], 
imply a specific support structure of agents' opinions. As a consequence of 
this structure, at any date and any candidate for temporary equilibrium at that 
date each agent's demand for futures contracts on curren* markets is bounded 
below by the agent's known endowment at the subsequent market date. Thus at 
such candidate prices, agents choose contracts on current markets that they can 
honor at the next market date independently of prices at that date and thereby 
avoid bankruptcy.
4 
Aggregate demand for futures contracts is bounded below by 
the total resources of the economy at the next market date. The existence of 
a temporary equilibrium for the economy at any date and any history of temporary 
equilibria up to that date follows in a routine fashion. 
The three assumptions mentioned above are presented and discussed in 
Section 3. The result concerning the support structure of agents' opinions and 
the consequence of this result for individual demand for futures contracts are 
also presented in this section. In Section 4, equilibrium concepts are defined 
and the existence results are established. In Section 5, some concluding 
remarks are made on the restrictive nature of the basic assumptions and the 
support structure of opinions they entail. 
For convenience, the basic structure, assumptions, and results of the 
model in [8] are reviewed in Section 2. The reader is referred to [8] for 
complete notation, terminology, definitions, etc., espec'ally [8: Section 2]. 
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2, The Basic Model 
2.1 Markets and Agents  
The setting is an exchange economy where-markets are open at each of an 
infinite sequence of dates, indexed by the set IN of positive integers, for spot 
trading and one-period unconditional futures contracting in t z 2 elementary 
(non-dated, non-storable) commodities. Terms of exchange at date n are 








, the price space for date 
n markets.
5 
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is the set of price-action histories through prices at date n. Similarly, 
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x S
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x 	is the set of price-action histories from actions at n 








is the consumption set of an agent. 






















will denote the projection of the product space onto Sn (the first 2 coordinates of 
S
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) is the futures price 
component of s
n 	







(n) ] = {n (n) • h (n) E H (n) ,s (n) = (Cl (h (n) ),..., n (h (n) ))), the set of 
price-action histories -ith common price history s (n) . 
The typical agent is identified by a 4-tuple < 	 The vector b3 
 
2, 
is an elemeat of It and represents the preexisting contracts of the agent at 
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date 1. If b
Oj 
< (>) 0, the agent has contracted to deliver (receive)lb
Oj 
units 
of commodity j at date 1. The sequence w = [w
nnEN 
is a known naturally occurring 
endowment with w
n 
the endowment vector (w, ER ) received at date n. The 
relation -4 is a preference ordering on the space :(C) of probability measures 
on (the Borel sets of) C.
7 














) is the history of prices and actions for the agent up through date n, 
then qn(h(n),an) is the agent's subjective probability measure over date n + 1 
(equilibrium) price systems. 
2.2 Assumptions  
The assumptions made in [8] on agents' characteristics are listed here for 
the sake of reference. The reader is referred to [8: Section 2.3] for details 




 + b0 	A 
t 
O' 	n 
and w,EIR14' n 2 2. 
Assumption (A.2): There exists a bounded continuous function u: C 	such 
if vl2 ,v E 	v 
that (i) 	
l 	
if and only if ludv 1 5 SUdv 2 ; (ii) u is concave 








, then u(c1 ) < u(c
2
). 
To state the assumptions on agents' opinions, some further notation is 
required. For each n and history (h (n) ,an ), let an (h (n) ,an ) = supp(qn (h (n) ,an )), 
the support of the probability meab.re qn(h(n),an). The correspondence o
n 
has closed values, but they may be unbounded. Under Assumption (A.3) below, it 
will suffice for technical purposes to deal with a compact base for the closure 
of the convex cone generated by a
n





x # 0, let Z= x( Em
j=1  lx.1) -1











defined by 3n (h (n), an) = n (h(n), a n )), 
where Q
2 
is the unit simplex in 1R, and "cl" denotes closure.
9 
Henceforth, unless specifically stated otherwise, the quantifier "for 
each n in 24" is understood in definitions, assumptions, theorems, etc. Also, 
if the range of a variable is left unspecified in such statements it is 
understood to be the relevant projection or factor space of H. For example, 
in (A.3)(i) to follow, the range of (h(n)'an) 
 and (h'
(n)
, a') is H
(n) 
x A. 




 k = 1,...,n, then 
qn (h (n)
,a




(iii) an is u.h.c. on H













) = 1. 
Interpretations and immediate implications of the various parts of Assumption 
(A.3) are given in [8: Remarks (2.3.4) - (2.3.8)1 In light of (A.3)(i), q n , an 
 and objects derived from them are alternately written as functions of the entire 
history or as functions defined on S
(n) 
as convenience dictates. In light of the 
continuity assumption (A.3)(iv) that the boundary of a n (.) has subjective 
probability zero, the price systems in int u
n
(-) are referred to as price  








(fin+1(sn+1)) is a relative (spot) (futures) price forecast [8: Definition (2.3.9)]. 
Consistency and continuity of agent choice depends significantly on the 
set of price systems Q 1 and the relation Q n , n z 2, defined formally in 
[8: Definition (2.3.10)]. The set Q
1 
consists of price systems s, for date 1 
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2 „ 
whose futures price component 
;1(sl)' 
perhaps after a scale change, is a spot 
price forecast for date 2 at the history si , i.e., for some A > 0 and p EIRE" , 
, 	2, 





 ). Similarly, for n 	2 and price history s(n-1) 
through 
date n-I, Qn (s (n_ /) ) is the set of price systems s
n 
for date n markets whose 




), up to a scale change, is a spot price forecast 
n  
for date n+1 at the history (s (n_w sn). The importance of these prices 
follows from [8: Theorem (3.2.2)]. According to this result, if an agent's 
set of feasible actions at date n and history h (n) is non-empty, it is 
bounded if and only if .ci (h (n) )E Qn(yh(n) 
) """c1-1 (h (n) )) 
 (= Q1 if n = 1). 
In light of this result, the following assumption is made. 
Assumption (A.4): Q1 0 0 and for n Z.- 2 and s 
	
E (n -1)' 
int an_ 1 (s (n_ 1) )c 0n (s (n_ 0 ). 
The inclusion assumed in (A.4) can be interpreted as a weak form of an 
expectations hypothesis. It states that the futures component of every price 
forecast for date n is, up to a scale change, a forecast of spot prices for 
date n+1, where the term "forecast" is used in the sense described earlier as 
opposed to the stronger sense of conditional mean forecast. See [8: Remarks 
(2.3.12), (2.3.13)] for comments and problems regarding such unbiased forecasts 
and the cor/Lsponding expectations hypothesis. 
The graph of the correspondence int a
n' 
considered as a subset of H (n+1)' 
is denoted by y°. Under (A.3), r is open in 
H(n1) 
[8: Remark (2.3.8)]. -n 
01 is open in Si, and for n z 2, Qn is open valued and has an open graph in S 
[8: Remark (2.3.11)]. For convenience, opinions satisfying (A.3) and (A.4) are 
referred to simply as consistent. 
(n) 
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2.3 Demand Relations  
Informally, an action for an agent at date n consists of a vector c
n 
of 






) of futures 
contracts, where bnj > (<) 0 indicates a contract to receive (deliver) lb n .1 
units of commodity j at date n+1. The convention f
n-1n 
= w + bn_i , for all 
n E]N, defines net futures contracts made at date n-1, and an action at date 
n is formally defined to be a vector a
n 
= (c n,f 
n 
 )E A l [8: (3.1.1)].  '- 
Solvency and feasibility of action at any date are determined relative to 
the price system prevailing at that date and the agent's known endowment aug-
mented by futures contracts made at the previous date. For a given (agent 




 n-1(h(n))'wn+1)  denotes that part of the 



























) is the present value of this augmented endowment at 
prevailing date n prices yh (n) ). If rn (h (n) ) z 0, the agent is defined to be 
solvent at h (n) , while if rn (h (n) ) < 0, the agent is defined to be bankrupt at 
h(n) [8: (3.1.2)]. 
Action at date n and history h (n) is feasible if the agent is solvent at 
h
(n) 
[8) (3.1.2)] and agents plan to be solvent with subjective certainty 
[8: (3.1.4)]. The feasible action action relation for an agent, denoted by 
D
n' 











) consists of those actions a
n 








) and the planning constraint that 
rn1(h(n)'an'sn+1)2 
 0 
for all s E 0 (ha ) [8: Remark (3.1.5)1 If r(h) < 0, then D(h) 
n+i n (n)' n n (n) n (n) 
 is empty, by definition [8: (3.1.2),(3.1.3)]. The domain of D n is denoted by 
dom Dn ( = [h (n) : Dn (h (n) ) 0 .1), and its graph by 
- 10 - 
With regard to consistency and continuity of agent choice, the following 

















) is non-empty, compact and convex valued, and continuous 
[8: Section 3.2]. An agent's infinite horizon expected utility maximization 
problem is cast in the framework of dynamic programming in [8: Section 4.1] 
and consistency and continuity of intertemporal choice in this context is 
established in [8: Section 5]. In particular, an agent's date n demand rela-




='A, is defined in [8: (5.1.5)]. This relation 
* 
is non-empty, compact, and convex valued and u.h.c. on Hn [8: Lemmas (5.1.6),(5.3.1)], 
satisfies the budget constraint with equality on H
n 
 [8: Corollary (5.3.3)], and 
is such that dn (h (n) ) = 0 if fl (h (n) ) f Qn(E1(h(n)),...,&n_1(h(n))) 
[8: Theorem (5.3.5)]. 
3. Opinions in the Aggregate 
The economy consists of a finite number of agents indexed by the set 
4 = (1,..,I), where I Ell. If i (4, all agent i specific objects are denoted 
with a presuperscript i. Thus agent i's characteristics are written 
* 




= 1Q1 , and 
H
* 
= (1-An-lx S  nn-1' ) 	n Z2, etc. The economy is E = 	 >:iE,J). 
Assumptions (A.1) - (A.4) are maintained for each 1.E s. throughout the sequel. 
3.1. Common Price Forecasts  





) 	n -int ian-1 (s(n-1) ). Then Pn (s (n_ 1) ) is the set of price forecasts 
for date n common to all agents at the history s (n_1) . Define the sets IP
n 
inductively as follows: Let P i = ril i dc21 , and for n a. 2, let 
Pn = [s(n) = (s (n_ 1) ,sn)E S (n) : s (n-1) 
 
E]Pn-1 ' sn E Pn (s (n-1) )3 ' 
The only candidates for a temporary competitive equilibrium for date 1 
* 
markets are those price systems, if any, inlP 1 since F1 = niEzi
i 
 Hi is the domain 
of aggregate demand for date 1. This follows from [8: Theorem (5.3.5)]. The 
importance of common price forecasts for the equilibrium existence question Jor 
date n, n 2, is similar. For a given price history s (n_1) , if i 	and 
Hn_ i [s (n_l) ] x An_
1







 is non- 
empty, compact, and convex valued and u.h.c. on 
Pn(s(n-1)). 
 Thus the candidates 
for a finite sequence of temporary equilibria up through date n must include 
those price histories, if any, in the set7Pn . In this regard, the following 
assumption seems reasonable. 
- 12 - 




(n-1) ) 	O. 
Remark (3.1.2): In words, (A.5) ensures the existence of histories of 
common price forecasts beginning from prices in the domain of aggregate demand 
for date 1. The assumption that F i 4 0 is analogous to [5: (4.1)]. Note, 
however, that for n z 2, P n (s (n...1) ) is not necessarily the set of admissible 
prices in the usual sense, i.e., the domain of aggregate demand, and hence the 
non-emptyness of Pn (s (1-1) ) is not strictly necessary for the existence of a 
temporary equilibrium at date n (see the comments below preceeding (A.7)). The 
behavior of aggregate demand off Pn (s (n...1) ) is not well understood though, and 
(A.5) is made in the face of this ignorance. 
Remark (3.1.3): The last part of (A.5) is implied by a "common expectations" 
hypothesis under the first part of (A.5), (A.3)(i), the convexity assumption 
of (A.3)(ii), (A.3)(iv), and an integrability assumption. To formulate this 
hypothesis, let 






iE,;, be opinions satisfying these assumptions. 
Using notation similar to that in L8: Remark (2.3.12)3, let 
iE( n+lkl'" ' s n )(s (n) ) 
 denote suggestively the vector integral 
:sn+11qn(dsn+1Is(n))' 
which is assumed 
to be finite (in each corrdinate) for all i and 
s(n). 
 Expectations are sair' 
to be common at n and son) 
if 1E( n+1 1 1 ,—, n)(s (n) ) = 1tE( 11+1 1 1''''n)(s (n) ) 
 for all i, i', and in this case the common expectation is written without presuper- 
script. The "common expectations" hypothesis is that expectations are common 
at n onFn , for each n. By assumptionF, 4 0. By convexity in (A.3)(ii) and by 
(A.3)(iv), 1E(n+1 1 1 ,.., 11 )(s (n) )E int io n (s (n) ) for each i and (n) . The 
last part of (A.5) follows from the hypothesis by repeated application of this 
result, which says simply that (common) expectations are (common) price forecasts. 
- 13- 
It is clear that the essence of the commonness assumption in [5: (4.2)] 
is not that there exists common price forecasts,
11 
but rather that there are 
common price forecasts that are invariant with respect to the history at which 
the forecast is made. What this invariance implies can be seen in the context 
of the present model for n = 1. Under (A.4), for every s i in 1)l ,  El (s 3 ) is, 
up to agent specific changes in scale, a common spot price forecast for date 2 
at the history s
1, 
i.e., for each i there exists A
i 	








ks1 ' P ,t 
nt a1
ks 1 ). If s l E cl l' 
but s
1 EIPl' 
this is no longer the 
case - since s
1 
lies outside of 1Q
1 
for one or more i. As illustrated in the 





such that E1 (s1 ) is a common spot price forecast in the 
above sense at every history s
1
. 12 
The following assumption can_be viewed as a dynamic anolog of this result on 
common spot price forecasts. For B c1R
m 
 B 	0, let r(B) denote the smallest 
cone containing B. 











) such that E 2 (S' 	YE n 41 (r(int ia 	(s 	))). n+1 n+1 iE<A n+2 	n+1 (n+1) 
Remark (3.1.4): Under (A.4), the consequence in 'A.6) holds automatically 
for all histories of common price forecasts, i.e., for all s(r1+1) inlPn+1. Take 
s
n+1 = En+1 (s (n+1)
). This may no longer be automatic for a history 
s
(n+1) = (s (n)
,s
n+1
) if  s(n)Pn  E 
	but sn+1 9Pn+1 (s (n) 
E 	 ) (the boundary of Pn+1 (s(n) )) 
since s
n+1 may lie outside i Qn+1 (s (n)
) for one or more i. This will perforce 
be the case under (A.7) below for all s 	E IP and some s 
n+1 
E 	(s 	). The 
	
(n) n 	 n+1 (n) 
essence of (A.6) then is that for such price histories there exists a common price 
- 14 - 
forecast s
n+1 
at s(11) such that n 
2 
+1
(gn+1) is a common spot price forecast for 
date n +2 at the history (s
(n)'sn+1)' 
13 
Remark (3.1.5): Note that unlike the invariance involved in the implication 
of (A.6) may depend on the specific history of [5: (4.2)], the g
n+1 
(s
(n)'sn+1)* The invariance involved in [5: (4.2)] can be achieved under the 
common expectations hypothesis of (3.1.3) and the additional hypothesis that 
expectations also produce spot price forecasts in the sense that for each i and 
(s 
(n) ' sn+1 	n+1 ), 	(1E( n+1 k 1' ' ' n )(s (n) 1+2M  ))E 	int lan+1(s(n)' sn+1))). 
If 
n 
expectations are common at n on
n 




(n) 	n 	 114.1k1,—,n)(s(n)) 
satisfies the consequence in (A.6) for every sn+1 . Under reasonable assumptions, 




(n) ) is a price forecast for n+1 at s(n). Tha additional 
hypothesis says that the futures component of this price forecast is a spot 
price forecast for n+2 at s
(n) 




The final assumption on agents' opinions involves obtaining a set of prices 
suitable for application of a market equilibrium theorem, e.g., the theorem of 
Debreu [3]. For n=1 there is no problem so long as1P 1 
 is convex (c.f. [5: Remark 4.8]). 
For n > 1 and appropriate personal histories with common price history 
s
(n-1)
, aggregate demand on date n markets will be non-empty, compact, 




 of common price forecasts 
at s(n-1). 
 For date n prices outside the larger (under (A.4)) set 
fliE4R
i
Qn (s (n_ 1) ), demand for some agent, and hence aggregate demand, will not be 
defined [8: Theorem (5.3.5)]. The following example indicates that this set is 
indeed larger in general and may not be suitable for an existence argument. 
- 15 - 









be identically normalized Lebesgue measure on 
n, 





E int B x int B 	
iQn 
E IRk x r(int B). Thus (A.4) holds and ++ 
Y
1 
 =Mk xr(int B), Pn a int B x int B, n > 1, verifying (A.5) and (A.6). But 
-14. 








some s (n_ 1) , 
such that some agent is bankrupt at s
n 
unless a
r21-1 ( 1an-1 )E1R+ for each i, i.e., 
unless every agent's net demand for futures contracts at date n-1 is non-
negative. 
While non-negative net demand for futures contracts makes the existence 
question much easier, this result is difficult to guarantee without further 
assumptions on agent's preferences or opinions. The problem in the above 






do not generate the same cone 
of prices. This is ruled out explicitly in the following assumption. For 
B c1R
m
, B 0 and convex, B is said to have a base for r(B) if there is a convex 
subset B' 	B such that if x E r(B), x 0 0, then x has a unique representation 
of the form x = MD, some scalar X >0 and some b in B' L10: 3.1.,p.25]. 








( niee;Qn ( s(n-i) )) ' 




'emark (3.1.7): The assumption that P i is convex is analogous to [5: (3.4)]. 




 and nie4 1 Qn(s(n-1))  generate the same cone 




(n-1) ), if a limit exists and the limit point is not in Pn (s (n_ 1) ), it will 
and an_ i E dn_1 ( h (ri-1) ), there exists prices s n EIR++ x r(int B) 
- 16- 
not be in 
i
Qn(s(n-1)) 
 for some i. The assumption that 
Pn(s(n-1)) 
 has a relatively 
compact base for this cone ensures that one can get to the boundary of the 





3.2 The Support Structure of Opinions  
The size of futures contracts demanded by an agent at any date is con-
strained by the intertemporal consistency requirement that the agent plan to be 
solvent at the next date with subjective certainty. The implied constraint on 





[8: (3.1.4)]. This constraint can be stated in terms of the support correspon-", 
dence 
i













an' sn+1) = sn+1
.(f
n')11+2 )z 0 for every 
i 
sn_o_ Eon (s (n) ). Equivalently, and perhaps more conveniently, a n = (cn ,fn)E Dn (h (n) ) 
if and only if cn = 0 and sn+1 • 
[8: Lemma (3.2.5)] . 
Since i
wn+2 is positive, by (A.1), how negative the coordinates of f n 
can 
be depends significantly on the agent's relative price forecasts or their limits 
sn4.1 .Toseetheextremecase,forj=1,...,22,,lete.=(eli ,. . . ,e 22,j ) , 
where e
kj 






e. E 	on (s (n) ). Then e.*( 	 = fnj and hence (cn'  f n
)e D;(h (n) ) only if 
1 +2 
fnj 	
0. Similarly, if [e
j 
 : j = 1,...,2.3 c 
jan(s(n))' 
the extreme case, then 
for c
n 
 .. .. 0, (c 
n 
 ,f 
 n 	n 
)E iD2(h(n) ) if and only if fn ,_.?-. 0, i.e., iD2(h(n) ) =11/:: x]Rl. 
 
In words, in the extreme case, demand for net futures contracts will be non-
negative, and hence total futures contractr demanded b
n 
f
n 	 n+1 
will be 
bounded below by the agent's resources at the next date, n + 1. Let Q
1 
denote 




0 for every sn+IE on (s (n) ) 
- 17- 












) is convex by (A.3)(ii), the extreme case obtains 
at s
(n) 
for agent i if and only if s
(n) E 
The principal result of this work is that the extreme case is common at 
common price forecast histories and their limits. 
Theorem (3.2.2): Under (A.3) - (A.7), clP
n
74 i 	for each i ea and n 
The proof of this result is given in Section 3.3. The basic consequence 
of the extreme case is stated formally in the following. 




, then for each i 	and 






h (n) ) = +
Z 
. 
3.3 Proof of Theorem (3.2.2)  
Let n EIN be given and let s (n)ElPn , which is non-empty by (A.5). The objec-
tive is to show that 21 x [03 	an(s
(n)
) for each i. The same conclusion will 
then follow for s
(n) in clPn since 	on has a closed graph by (A.3)(iii). The 
proof is by contradiction using a fixed point argument. Since the point s on) 
remains fixed throughout the proof, objects such as 
Pn+1(s(n)) 
 and 	on (s (n)
) 
are abbreviated to P
n+1 
and ion , respectively. For clarity, the restriction of 
— 
the mapping x 	x to M
24. 
will be denoted by p, i.e., p(x) = x( 	x.)
-1
, if 40 	 j=1 j 
x EV
0' 
 but where convenient, images under p will be denoted by a tilde. Thus 
p(P
n41
) is abbreviated to Pn+1. 	Clearly p is continuous and maps open (convex) 
sets to open (convex) sets. By (A.3)(ii) and (A.5) it follows that P n+1 is a 
non-empty open convex subset of ri2
2 
 . 




and it suffices to show that:j=1 	2.3 c clPn+1. 
	




15n+1  c niR2z . Suppose that for some j, 1 sj s 
	e
j 	cli5n41 . 15 ++ 
* 
Under this assumption it is shown that there exists a point x* in P
n+1 
such 
that for some scalar A > 0, Ax
* E ri . 
i
on+1  (s (n)  ). It follows then by (A.7) s  
* 	 * 
that x 
En+1)  and hence that x t Pn+1' which is the contradiction. The 
arument is broken into several steps. 
* 
Step 1. The set P
n+1 
is not necessarily convex, but an appropriate image 
r of itis.Let02 =bctQ2 :x.=01 and let 	2 \le.1 -' 0 be given by 
8(x)=e.+(1 - x.)
-1
(x - e.). Then 5(x) is the unique point in Q3 on the 
line through the closed segment [e x]. 
Lemma (3.3.1): a is continuous and maps open (convex) sets to open (convex) 
sets. 
?roof: Continuity of a is clear from its specification. Let 
B,Q2 \Le.jbe open, let II t a(B), and let x t B such that X = a(x). Let 




(x) = [x' t 	Q : h x - x' < e J. 
If x' E B (x) n 2 , let x' = x.e. + (1 - x.)x'. Since 0 s x. < 1, 
j 	 J 	• 
E s-Z 	(e.) and 8(xC) 	 fic 	= 	x.) Il x — < 	and hence 
x' E B.ItfollosgsthatBe WandthusthataMisopehin22.If 
- 	 - 
B is convex and x E a(B), x
k 	 k 
E B, with x = a(x
k
), k = 1, 2, for any A, 0 < A < 1, 
definey=A(1 1-A)(1-x.))
-1 
 . Then 0 < y < 1 and 
XX I + (1 - 	= 	+ (1 - y)x2 ), and hence a(B) is convex.0 
By Lemma (3.3.1), the set a(clP
n+1
)is a compact convex subset of SZ. 
This set will serve as the domain and range of a map to which a fixed-point 
theorem will be app"..ed. To simplify notation one step further, the image 
B(c.1T
n+1
) will be denoted by T
4.1 
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Step 2. There are several steps in constructing the appropriate mapping. 









such that x = a(x) and define h(x) = supth E (0,1) : he i + (1 - h.)x Ei311+1 ). 
Then 0 < X(x) < 1 since ej 
	




 [12: Theorem 6.4]. 
— 
Define g : 1311+1 -.c1P114.1 by letting g(X) = h(x)e j + (1 - A(x))x, for any 
x E Pn+1 with x = a(x). By definition of X(x), g(x) does not depend on the 
particular x and g(x) E ciP
n+1 
n Pn+1   [9: Corollary 2, p. 21]. Since 
Q 	 22 







complete this step, define the correspondence g : Tro.1 	clProl by 
g(k) = [g(x)j if x E a
n+i 
., and g(Cc) = Lei ,scJ n cii5n+1 if x E 13 n+1 n 3n+1' 
where [e.,Cc] is the closed line segment joining e. and x. 
Lemma (3.3.2): g is continuous on a
n+1 














 = x. Let 
c, x,x J 
ki 
 icEN fin+1 	
x 	
l 




). The sequence ix
k 
 I can be cl,osen 
so that limk xk = x, essentially as in the proof of Lemma (3.3.1), by taking a 
decreasing sequence of balls about x and x. Let [Mx
k'




),g(x ))J that converges to some point (h 0 ,x0) in 
[0,1] xc1Pili. I .Thenx() =X 13e.±(1 - X°)x, A ° < 1, and hence x° EJR . 
0 	 -lc  
Also, x q 15n+1 
since g(x ) E Pn+1 c Pn+1' 
which is closed in 0. Thus 
0 	* 	 0 	 -1c' 
x E Pniend by Lemma (3.3.1), a(x ) = limka(g(x )) = a(x) = x. By the 
uniqueness of g(X), x0  = g(X), proving that g is continuous at Cc. 
Clearly, dom g 
=11+1 
and g is compact and convex valued on dom g. B- 
„ 
Lermia. (3.3.1),aro_lisopenin J 
	
g and thus 	is u.h.c. on an4d' Suppose 
)1 	
, 	— 	 - 	- 	 - - 
E an+landletlxIcari.lwithli% x
k 
 x= . For each k, let xk  E g(x ). 
Since. 
clP11+1 
is compact, there exists a subsequence Ix k' 3 of bck i converging 
- 20 - 




 By definition of g, for each k there exists A
k 
 E [0,1) 
such that xic = Ake.
3 
 + (1 - A
k 
 )x
k  . It follows that X
k' 
converges and hence that 
r 	- xx0  E Le., j n clP
n+1 
= g(ii). By [6: Theorem 1, p.24], g is u.h.c. at X. 1 .7 













Lemma (3.3.3): clProl = p(c1P11+1 ) and Pri:1 	p(Pn:1 ). 
Proof: Since p is continuous, p(c1p114.1 ) g 	To go the other way, 






j g Pn+1 with link x
k 
= x. Let ty
kl 
 g P.141 with 
( 	l k = p(y
k
), and let [yk .1 be a subsequence of ty
k  j converging to some y in 
clP'+i. By [10: Proposition 3.2, p. 25], y 	0, and hence limk ,P(Yki
) = p(y). 
Thus x = p(y) E p(c1131.0.1 ), and the equality is proved. If in addition 
 
x E rn+1 , then y 	Pri+1 but y Ell++ since x.E3R++
2Z 
._ Consequently, y E Pn+1 , 
proving the second inclusion. ❑ 
Lemma (3.3.4): c1Pi41 is a compact base for r(c1P ni.1 ) and p is a homeo-
morphism between c1P' 	and c1P
n+1. n+1 
Proof: By [10: Proposition 3.6, p.26], there is a strictly positive (with 
regard to the order in B
22, 
determined by the cone r(pn+1 ) U CO)) linear func-
tional L on E")" such that Pn
+1 
 = L-I (1) n 
r(pn+1 
 ). Since L is then continuous, 
L
-1








(1) n r(c1P +1 ). Then for some A > 0, Ay E c1Pn+1 and there exists a 
k 	 - _ sequence Ly j g P
n+1 





 ' and A
k 






, uniquely. It follows that 
-1 k k A A'y -.y. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, it may be assumed that 
,k 
A converges to some A' > 0 and that yk  converges to some y' E c1P'+1' Then 
- 21 - 
1 	 -1 
	
A'y' = y and y,y' E L (1) imply that A 	= 1 and hence y = y'. Therefore 
cl?'+1  = L
-a 
 (J) n T(c1P
n+1
). If y E F(c1P
n
), y 	0, it also follows by this 
same argument that L(y) = L(X My') = -1 X' > 0, rind hence L is strictly posi-
tive with regard to the order inR
2g, 
determined by the cone r(c1P
n+1 ) U 10). 
By [10: Proposition 3.6, p. 26], c113141 is a base for r(c1P 114.1 ). 
It follows from the properties of such a base and Lemma (3.3.3) that p 
restricted to c1P1'11.1 is one-to-one and onto e11511+1 . Since p is continuous and 
c1P' 	is compact, p so restricted is a homeomorphism. 0 n+1 
Henceforth, let p
1 
denote p restricted to c1P1n+1  and let p 2 denote the 
irverse of p1 . 
Step 4. A crucial step in this construction relates common price forecasts 
and their limits to other common price forecasts as suggested in (A.6). For 














y)))1. Similarly, define th_ 
aggregate relation i 	c1P1.0.1 	Pn+1 bytti(Y) = n iEa"Y) ' 
Lemma (3.3.5): dom 
i 




I) and 4; are open and convex 
valued and 1.h.c. on c1Pn+11 
each i E ,E. 
Proof; That 
i
4) is open and convex valued and l.h.c. on dom 
14 
 follows 
fromCA.3)(iil. If dom 	
i 
= c1P11.4.1 , then 4) inherits these properties of 
[6: 6(2), p.35]. That dom 	= c1P1.41 is precisely what (A.6) states. 
Step 5. Since IP takes values in 
Pn+1' 
its image under p takes values in 
Pn+1. 
but a simple mapping of tp into 
13n+1 
would loose the identity of appro-
priate values of this correspondence. This identity can be preserved by using 
first. Define the correspondence V ; c1Pi.14.1 	by tP(X) = PWP 2 (x))). 
- 22 - 
Lemma (3.3.6); 4) is open and convex valued and 1.h.c, on dom th =
nl' 





•c1Fn1. The result then n+1 , 
follows from Lemmas (3.3,4) and (3.3.5). "Q 
Step 6, It follows from Lemma (3,3.6) and [7; Theorem 3.10 1 "(c)] that 
th admits a continuous selection, i,e., there exists a continuous function 
f
n+1 
E?1 such that for each. x E cli
n+1' 	- - 
f(k) E 1)(x). This function is 
the final part needed for the construction. For each 	ET"n+1, let 
k(X) = a(co(f(i(X)))), where 	is the image under f of the set g61 and 
i(X) is the image under a of the convex hull of this set. 
Lemma (3.3.7): dom k = 7i114.1 , f is compact and convex valued and u,h,c. 
on T11+1' and k(X) 	13'n+1  for each x ETn+.1.• 
Proof; By Lemmas (3.3.1), (3.3.2), continuity of f, and [1: Theorem 1', 
p. 113], f is compact and convex valued and u.h.c. on dom f. By Lemma (3.3.6L, 
dom f = 11+1' By construction, f(g(x)) 
	
JP(i(;)).c n+1' 
and by convexity of 
1311+1' f(i)( n+1 ) E n+1* 
Step 7. By Kakutani's theorem [1: p. 174], the correspondence f has a 
,* 	,
n+1 	
..* 	, ,* 
fixed-point, i.e., there exists x E 0 such that x E t(X ) By Lemma 
(3.3.7), x E an+1 and thus g(x ) = {g(x )} and k(x ) = Dcf(g( )))-19 
..* 	 ..* 	* 	,* 
implying that x = 0(f(g(x ))). Let x = g(X ). It remains to verify that 
* 
x is the vector sought at the outset. 
	
* 	- * 	 „* 	* 
By construction of g, x E F
n+1* 
















) is the it  coordinate of f(X ). 
2 - 	 2 




) = (1 - f,(x
* 
 ))
-1  En+1 (f(x
*
)). Also by construction of 
-* 	 , 	* * 2 -* 
g, x
* 
= g(x ) implies that x = x ), and hence thatn+10.i ) = 
* -1 2 	* 	 2 * 	 * 	* -1 2 	* (1 - x.) 	n+1  (x ). It follows that n+1




- x.) (x ). 
- 23 - 
* 
Lety,=(1-f.(x ))(I - x.)_
1 
 > 0, and let y = p
2





 = x* . Since f selects from p, f(x
* 
 ) E IP(x
* 
 ) = P(T(Y )), and 
' * hence for some y 3 > 0, 1 3f(x ) E 1Pky ). By definition of i and these results, 
2 	 2   

















and the proof is complete. 
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4. Equilibrium 
4.1 The Initial Condition  
Throughout Section 4, the economy E is assumed to satisfy (A.1) - (A.7). 
For each n, w
n = E.wn 
denotes the total resources of E available at date 
n. In terms of these resources, (A.1) suffices for the study of individual 
agent behavior and for aggregate behavior for n > 1. For aggregate behavior 
at date 1, the following initial condition is needed. 
Assumption (A.0): E. 	( 1 w1 	1b 0 ) = w 	FR F . 4+
The equality in (A.0) states that the aggregate of preexisting contracts 
is consistent with (a preexisting) equilibrium in futures contracts, i.e., 
E iE6l ibo = 0. The second condition in (A.0) states that eery commodity is in 
positive supply at the first market date. Assumption (A.0) is also maintained 
throughout Section 4. 
4.2 Temporary Competitive Equilibrium  






 denote a 
n
relatively compact base for the cone F(Pn(s(n-1))). To avoid treating the case 
for n = 1 separately, the following conventions are adopted. For n = 1, the 
.statement "s (n-1) ElPn-1 
(or  S(n-1) ) and 1Sn-1 E n-1 
n (H(n-1)[s(n-1)] x  An-1 )" 
2 	 2 
is vacuous, while the symbolism "an-1(15n-1)"  or "a
n-1
(1 h (n) )" stands for 
w1 	b0
' Similarly, for n = 1 the symbolism "Pr(s(n-1) 






(except where noted in the proof of Theorem (4.2.6) in Section 4.3). 
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Definition (4.2.2): Suppose s
(n-1) 
E S (n-1) , and 
6n- 1 E iAn-1 n (H(n-1)[s(n-1)]  x An-1), each i E 	A temporary competitive  
equilibrium (TCE) for E at date n relative to the histories 
 i6n-1' 	E 	is 
* 1 * 	I *, 
an I + 1 -tuple (s
n' 
an'' an ) such that 
(4.2.3)(i) 	s: E Pn (s (n_ 1) ) 
(4.2.3)(ii) 	ia: E idn ( ih (: ) ), i E 
(4.2.3)(iii) E . 	lan - E iE (an2_ 1 ( ih (: ) ), iwn+1 ), 
where ih
(n  *) = (i6 	sn*)(ih(1 *) = s *1 ) 	E t. ' 
Remarks (4.2.4)(i): The restriction in (4.2.3)(i) serves to limit the 
scope of the concept of a TCE. We have 113 knowledge about the existence of 
equilibria that do not satisfy this restriction, yet there are concepts and 
results involving the class of equilibria that do satisfy this restriction. 
In addition, one can interpret (4.2.3)(i) for n > 1 as requiring that opinions 
be fulfilled in a weak sense at equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium price 
system must be a common price forecast at the relevant history. For each 
n Z 1, (under (A.4)) (4.2.3)(i) also requires that the futures component of 
the equilibrium price system s
n 
be a common spot price forecast for date 
n 	1 at the history 
(s(n-1)' 
s)(= s
l' if n = 1). 
(4.2.4)(ii): Condition (4.2.3)(ii) states that an equilibrium action 
i * i * 
an 
maximizes agent i's conditional expected utility given the history h
(n) 
subject to the appropriate budget and planning constraints at that history. 
Trivially then this condition entails that every agent is solvent at S. 
(4.2.4)(iii): Condition (4.2.3);iii) is the market clearing condition. 
The first 2. equalities require that aggregate demand on current spot markets, 
1* 
iE-r an (  an)' equal aggregate supply of commodities at date n after settlement 
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of futures contracts made at date n - 1. Total futures contracts of agent i 
















= a 2 f ih * 
n-1‘ (n) 1 
Aggregate supply after settlement of date n - 1 contracts is simply 







"(n)1' The second ft equalities in (4.2.3)(iii) 
require that date n futures markets clear, i.e., that E iE i  bn = 
i 	i * 













* 	1 * 	I * 
Definition (4.2.5): For each n, let Hn = Hn x...x Hn , with generic 





























n-1 E iAn-1 fl(H (n-1) [s (n-1)
3 x 
An-1) 
 for each i E 	write 












The following is the major existence result. Its proof is given in 
Section 4.3. 
Theorem (4.2.6): If s
(n-1) E
1P
n-1 and id n-1 E 	n 01(n-1)[s(n-1)3 
	
An-1)' 



















, I an)1 TIEN is an equilibrium  "  
* 1 * 	I * path for E if (s l , a 1 , ..., a l ) is a TCE for E at date 1, and for n > 1, 





) is a TCE for E at date n relative to the histories 
i 	* 1 * 	i 
6n-1 = (s 1, a i' an-l ), i E t,[. Thus an equilibrium path is a sequence 
of temporary equilibria in which the economy is in temporary equilibrium at 
each date relative to the past history of temporary equilibria. 
Corollary (4.2.8): There exists an equilibrium path for E. 
- 27- 
Proof: The crucial hypothesis of Theorem (4.2.6) is that for the relevant 
2 ,  histories, E
iE,Ean-1 ki n-1 ) = wn
, i.e., that the futures markets cleared at 
date n - 1. For n = 1, this condition holds by (A.0). By the theorem, there 
* 1 * 	I * 	 * 
exists a TCE (s 1 , a / , ..., a l ) for E at date 1, and s l EIP 1 . By (4.2.3)(iii), 
* 	i * 	* ± * s 1 and 6 1 = (s 1 , a 1 ) ' i E 	satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. Hence 
* 1 * 




) for E at date 2 relative to the histories 
i *. 	t 	 * 	* 	 * 	* 	* 	 i * i 6 / , E e-x, and s 2 E P2 (s i ). Thus s (2) = (s 1 , s 2 ) E IP2 and 6 2 = 
± * 	* ± 	r ( 6
1 , s 2' 
a
2 ) ' i E G4, 
satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem, etc. 0 
For an equilibrium path to make economic sense, it must be realizable 
from the perspective of the model of intertemporal choice for the agents. 
There must exist a solution to the agent's expected utility maximization 
problem as formulated in [8] that actually selects the successive equilibrium 
actions at the equilibrium prices. It follows from [8: Lemma (5.2.3)(i) - (iii)] 
that for the typical agent there exists a sequence 7 = (7 1 n-nEE of measurable 
* 	 * 
functions 7r
n 
H (n) 	An such that 77n selects from Dn on dom Dn and from do 
on H. It is shown in [8: Theorem (5.2.8)] that any such sequence 7 is a 
solution to the agent's intertemporal choice problem. 
* 1 * 	I * 
Definition (4.2.9): An equilibrium path [(s n , an , ..., an )3nEr is 




= I 7rn incr is a sequcne of functions satisfying [8: Lemma (5.2.3)(i) - (iii)] 
i * i * and 7r
n




n , for each i E ,6, n E 11, and for 
i
n*-1 as in Defini- 
tion (4.2.7). In this case, the equilibrium path is said to be realizable by  
* 1 




) is a competitive equi- 
librium (or just equilibrium) for E if s = {s
n ^nEN is the sequence of price 
1 * systems of some equilibrium path for E that is realizable by (7r, 	I * 7). 
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While it is important to point out that an equilibrium path, to make 
sense, should be realizable, the existence of an equilibrium for E is a trivial 
issue in this model. 
Theorem (4.2.10): Every equilibrium path for E is realizable and 
hence corresponds to an equilibrium for E. 
Proof: Follows directly from the second statement of [8: Lemma (5.2.3)]. ID 
4.3 Proof of Theorem (4.2.6)  
The strategy in proving Theorem (4.2.6) is essentially the same as in 
[5: Section 4]. The desired behavior of demand and aggregate excess demand is 
obtained in three lemmas, the first two of which are analogs respectively of 
[5: Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4]. If i E 	and h (n) E dom idn , let 
inf idn (h (n) ) = inf Danil : an E idn (h (n) )). Also if hn E H:, let 
inf son (hn ) = inf 	: z E tion (hn )]. 




















 and if (snjkEv 	
Pn(s(n-1)) with lim
k sn = sn e Pli (s (n_ 1) ), then for some 
i E1 rn_ 'nf 	(ld 	sn) = co. 
— 	k 1- n n-1'  
. 	r 	l 





























each i. By definition of 
Pn(s(n-1)), 









n)) i 0, for each i and k. Let c > 0 be given and choose 




) so that 11
-'.
a
kII < inf i 
 d
(





n n 	 n 
Since s
n 
E clP (s (n-1))  but sn 	PnT(s(n-1))' it follows that 




)) (as in the proof of Lemma (3.3.4)). If there is no i such 
that Il iak11 	oa, then we may assume (by passing to a subsequence if necessary) 
that iak 
tan E An , each i 
E If .12.1 (sn ) Ert.:4_, then irn (ih (n) ) > 0 and 
D
n 
is l.h.c. at 
i
h(n)' 
for each i E 4[8: Theorem (3.2.6)]. By [8: Lemma 
(5.3.4)] it follows that ian E idn ( ih (n) ), i E 4. But by (A.7), 
sn 	ikE4 Qn (s (n_ 1) ) and hence for some i Er.1 id n (ih(n) ) = 0 [8: Theorem 
(5.3.5)], a contradiction. If en (sn ) E IR+2 \ TR-:, then by definition 
sn 	iQn (s (n-1)
) for every i E =J1 Since sn E'(n-1))' 
sn z 0 by Lemma 
(3.3.4). Consequently (by (A.0) or (A.1)) s























for this i, and the same contradiction obtains. ❑ 
A similar result obtains for aggregate excess demand as a consequence of 
this lemma and Corollary (3.2.3). 
Lemma (4.3.2): Suppose that s(n-1) ElPn_, and 
i6 	E iA 	n (H 	[ s ] x An-1 ), i - E 	If E ielan2-1 (ión-1 ) = W n-1 n-1 (n-1) (n-1) n 
and if {s1:i j kEiN with limk s:, = Pn (s (n-1) ) 	 sii. 	Pn(s(n-1))' then  
k 










































i h k 
(n)
) so that 
k 	i k   
Then III E iE „if,. a i 1 11 - II (w n , 	s II kit  . 	By 
z = ( iE an ) - (w 	w 
	
n ' n+1 • 	 is 	i 
Corollary (3.2.3), i a1:1 Elfi.2_ each i and k, and by Lemma (4.3.1), 11 aril -4 00 
r 	i for some i E t-A. Thus 0 < --a nk  < E. 	ank , and the result follows. CI 
Recall Definition (4.2.5) and endow the set HI: with the product topology. 
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Lemma (4.3.3): so
n 
is non-empty, compact, and convex valued and u.h.c. 
* 
on N. 
Proof: Follows directly from [8: Lemmas (5.1.6), (5.3.1)] and standard 
arguments (e.g., [6: Propositions 4 and 5, p. 25]. ❑ 
Let 
s(n-1) 
and 1 5 ,1 _ 1 , i EJ, be as hypothesized in Theorem (4.2.6). It 




.... 	 n  
compact convex sets such that 0 # int P 1 g P
2 





Let son denote the restriction of V)A n-1' 
• ) to P
n
k 
. Without loss of generality 




nP; (s (n-1) ) i 0, for each k. (For the case n = 1, 
, 
use A2
2 n 11 for PI'l (s (n-1) ), where 2 2 is the unit simplex in 92 and X is a 
positive scalar such that X0
2 (1 IP
1 
i 0.). Clearly Pn
k 
 is compact and convex 
k , 	- 
P
k 
and P'n (s (n-1) ) = UkE1N P
n . Let Z
k 
 denote the range or(/' on 	. It follows from 
n n 
Lemma (4.3.3) that Z
k is compact. By [8: Corollary (5.3.3)], for each i and 
k and every s
n 








6 ni 	 - 









' 	'/  
on i gives Walras law s 
n 
 -tPk (s 
n













Since [sn 3kav 
 g P;(s(n-1)), 
 there is a subsequence of this sequence 
* 
converging to some s
n 
E c1P7n(s(n-1)  ). For convenience use the same index k 
for this subsequence. If s n E Pn(s (n_ 1) ), then by Lemma (4.3.3), there is a 
subsequence of [zk 
IkEll 




 6n-1' sn ). Clearly 





 = 0, and since s
n 
E Pn (s (n-1) ) = riPn (s (n-1) ) 	
, grt. - 	it follows by a ++ 
* 
standard argument that z = 0. 
* 
To prove that s
n 
E Pn(s(n-1)),  it suffices by Lemma (4.3.2) to show that 
k k the sequence [z
k
/kal 







dn-1' sn ) 
be such that z
k 
= (E -
ita an )   - (wn , wn+1)  (recall that wn = E. ant 
( i d
n-1 
1 Cti1 	'' 
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' each i and k. Let 
sn E Pn(s(n-1))  be arbitrary. Then for k sufficiently large, sn
.zk 5 0, 
- - which implies that 0 5 sn.EiEji 
i 
 n k 	n n 	 n 	i_i_ a 5 s-(w, w 	
\ 	Since s ElR 
24
, it n+1" 
i k follows that E iaan is bounded, and hence so is tzk jkEli. 0 
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5. Conclusions 
The results of this paper resolve in a positive way the issue of viabi-
lity of a purely competitive exchange mechanism in the context of sequential 
trading in spot and futures markets with no institutional arrangements for 
handling bankruptcy. The backbone of these results consists of the four 
assumptions (A.3)-(A.7) made on agents' opinions. Each of these assumptions 
has been discussed and interpreted as they were presented here and in [8]. 
The informal remarks in this section will be confined to the question of con-
sistency of these assumptions and to some related points regarding their re-
strictive nature. 
Fortunately, examples that are trivial in one sense suffice to verify con-
sistency of (A.3)-(A.7). Let iqn : S on) -4,9(Sn+1 ) be a continuous function 
chosen so that supp iqn (s (n) ) = 	and iqn (Ils(n) ) = 1, for all i, n, 
_ 
and s(n) . In this case, 1Q1 = i Qn (s (n_1) ) E It ++ 
2Z 
 for each i and (A.3) and 
2Z 
(A.4) hold. It follows also that PI E Pn (s (n_1) ) E E ++ , and (A.5), (A.6), and 
(A.7) hold as well, verifying the consistency of (A.3)-(A.7). 
The sense in which this example is trivial has to do with the constancy of 
the supports of the 
i
qn . The measures 
i
qn (s, ,) may vary in a non-trivial 
0-1) 
(but continuous) fashion with the price history s (n) and may vary from agent 
to agent, but the support ian (s (n) ) is constant in both son) and i (and 
in n). 
Actually, one can do a little better than this without much effort. Let 
ia
n be a continuous (u.h.c. and l.h.c.) correspondence on s on) with compact 
and convex values in ER
212. 







++ for every i, n, 
and s(n) . Also let ' a be a continuous measure valued function that generates 
iCYn' 	ici(s( r )) might be normalized Lebesgue measure on 
i
an (s (n) ). Then 
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_ 	 2k 
again one has that i 
	i 
Q1 = Qn(s(n-1)) E 3R
++ , and (A.3) and (A.4) hold for each 
i. If the a
n 






for each n 
ir.x 	 ++ 
and s (n) , then (A.5)-(A.7) hold as well. 
In this example, the supports 
i 
 an s (n) ) can vary both in s (n) and across 
agents, but essentially only in terms of changes in scale, which may be inter-
preted loosely as price level (in a non-monetary sense) variability. In con-
trast, there is no variability of the 
ian in terms of relative prices and the 
range of relative prices is maximal in the sense that for every i, n, and s (n)
, 
i, 
an ls (n) ) must contain a compact base for the cone M
2k 
+ 	If (A.7) is to hold • 
as well, the 
ian' i E 4, must share a compact base for lR 
2Z 
 at S. Equiva- + 
lently, all positive relative price systems (identified, e.g., with points of 
rir,
2
) are common relative price forecasts for n + 1 at s
(n) . 
One can obtain a sense of the restrictive nature of the assumptions (A.3)-
(A.7) by trying to construct an example sastisfying these assumptions that exhi-
bits a limited(as opposed to maximal) range of relative prices or relative spot 
prices. In doing so, one is frustrated by the basic implication of these assump-
tions, namely Theorem (3.2.2). It is clear from this result that one must speci-
fy the 
i
an in such a way that for important price histories s (n) , one has that 
E
I 
x [03Cn (s (n) ) for each i. One can show that for such s (n) , 
1 	. i r(nicA4.1 (int an (s (n) ))) = lc+ . It follows that for these important price 
histories the range of relative spot prices is maximal. Every positive relative 
1 
spot price system (every point in riC ) is a common spot price forecast (up to 
agent specific changes in scale) for n +.1 at s (n) . 
It is also clear, however, that what constitutes the important price his-
tories at any date n > 1, the set I?
n 
depends on the specification of the 
iak' k = 1,...,n - 1. One might attempt to avoid this dependence by assuming 










- section of the set defined in (3.2.1). In words the assumption says that 
for every positive date n price system s
n
, every positive relative spot price 
system is a spot price forecast (up to scale change) for agent i at ( 
' s (n-1)' sn ), 





) = ++. If this assumption is made for each i, then (A.?) implies 
that r(n into
n-1 (s (n-1)




The maximal range of relative spot price forecasts for important histories 
should come as no surprise. It is precisely this feature that is needed to avoid 
the possibility of bankruptcy (Corollary (3.2.3)) in the absence of institutional 
arrangements for this contingency. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 
S0075-14663 and SOC-7820169 to the Georgia Institute of Technology. Typing 
support was given by the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. 
I am indebted to Robert P. Kertz for helpful discussions and continued en-
couragement. 
2. C.f. [8: Section 1.1] for a discussion and review of the literature. 
3. Roughly speaking, a price forecast for an agent is a price system that is 
possible in the subjective opinion of the agent. The precise meaning of the 
term "Price forecast" employed in this work is slightly more restrictive. 
See [8: Definition (2.3.9)] and Section 2.2 below. 
4. Bankruptcy here is synonomous with negative net worth. A market opportunity 
based definition of bankruptcy, which is somewhat less arbitrary, is dis-
cussed in [8: Section 3.11. 
5. IR denotes the set of real numbers, ER ra the set of ordered m-tuples of real 
co 
numbers, m E El, and IR 	the set of sequences of real numbers. If 
x = 1 ,. 	xm  ) E 1R
m and y = (yy
m ) 
E TR la , then x y(y x) means 
x. s y., i = 1,...,m, x s y(y a x) means x y and x T y, and x < y(y > x) 
means xi 
	i Y 
< , i = 1,...,m. For 0 E M ul , M°,1 = (x: x E ER m , x 	0), 
Ul+0  = [x: x E M m , x a 03, and 1R
m
+  = :x: x E ER m , x > 03. These rela- , 
tions and sets are defined analogously on IR S. If x E P m , flxq denotes 
the Eculidean norm of x. 
6. C.f. [8: Section 3.1] and Section 2.3 below for the sense of the term "net". 
_7. Products of measurable (topological) spaces are given the product a-algebra 
(topology). For a topological space X, 2B(X) denotes the Borel subsets of 
X and Q(X) the set of probability measures on 1S(X) endowed with the to-
pology of weak convergence [2]. 
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8. It is convenient to distinguish a relation from a function by use of the 
symbol " =" in the former case and " 	in the latter case. All other no- 
tation and terminology follows [6: pp.4-5]. 
9. The notation "cl" and "int" denote, respectively, closure and interior rela-
tive to the ambient factor space of H in which the set lies. In this case, 
the space is SI14.1 . The relative interior of a convex set is denoted by "ri". 
10. C.f. also the discussion following [8: (3.1.6)]. 
11. This is really the thrust of [5: (4.1)]. Using the notation of [51, 
, 
15 (p) E 	co
i
n (p) for every p E P. Except for the possible non-con- 
vexity of ian (p) allowed in [5], in the terminology used here this says 
that P(p) is a common price forecast for date 2 at the history p for 
each p E P. 
12. In the notation and context of [5] the quantifier would be "for every p E A2 . 
13. The term "common spot price forecast" is a slight abuse of language, but the 
qualifying phase "up to agent specifice changes in scale" is cumbersome and 
this qualifier is dropped where convenient. 
14. Clearly the hypothesis could be restricted to (s/ 	S 	)  E 	x clP 	(s) kni' n+1 n+1 	/-1) • 
15. This supposition is a hypothesis that is implicit in all results of this 
section concerning the set P
n+1 and other objects denoted with an asterisk 
and all objects derived from these. 
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1. 	Introduction 
Models of resource allocation under uncertainty and over time lead 
naturally to infinite dimensional commodity spaces. Debreu, in a now classic 
paper [1], extended the basic theorems of welfare economics to include a 
large class of infinite dimensional spaces, clarifiying in a number of ways 
the essentially algebraic and reai analytic character of these theorems.. 
Under convexity assumptions on preferences and consumption sets, Debreu 
showed that a valuation equilibrium in which no consumer is satiated is a 
Pareto optimum ra:ThearPm -1j. . This,thorem relies only on the algebraic,. 
structure of the commodity space and algebraic (and order theoretic) proper-
ties of preferences and consumption sets, and does not depend at all on the 
dimensionality of these sets. 
A nontrivial (continuous) converse of this result is that a Pareto 
optimum is a valuation equilibrium relative to a nontrivial (continuous) 
linear functional. Debreu obtained a continuous converse [1:Theorem 2 and Remark], 
when the commodity space is a topological vector space, under the addi- 
tional assumptions that at least one consumer is nonsatiated, that preferences 
are continuous in a weak sense, which relies only on the analytical structure 
of the reals and not the topology of the commodity space, that the aggregate 
production set is convex, and that this set has an interior point or the 
commodity space is finite dimensional. 
-2- 
Both of these last assumptions impose dimensionality restrictions on 
the sets involved, the interior point assumption implying full dimensionality 
of the aggregate production set. The result relies on the Hahn-Banach theorem 
for the existence of the valuation functinal. 	If there is a prior reason to 
obtain continuity of this functional with respect to a given topology, then 
in the infinite dimensional case some interior point assumption is essential. 
In general, however, it is possible to relativise such an assumption 
to an appropriate subspace of the commodity space and thereby free the 
theorem of dimensionality restrictions. 	In addition, if one is not con- 
cerned with continuity of the valuation functional with respect to some par-
ticular topology, then the theorem can be obtained with an algebraic analog 
of the interior point assumption. In this form, the converse theorem is an 
algebraic/real analytic result free of dimensionality restrictions and is a 
natural generalization of the finite dimensional result. 	In the finest 
locally convex topology for the commodity space the algebraic assumptions and 
topological assumptions coincide and every linear functional is continuous, 
as in the finite dimensional case. 
The purpose of this note is to make these claims precise and to 
thereby clarify further the character of the converse theorem. The needed 
facts about vector spaces, internal points, etc., and the versions of the 
separation theorem used are presented in Section 2. The results on the con-
verse theorem are presented in Section 3. 
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2. The Separation Theorem 
2.1. Notation and Terminology. Except where noted, notation and 
terminology follow that in [6]. Throughout, E denotes a vector space over the 
ti 
real field R. 	If B c E, B 0 0, span (B) denotes the smallest subspace of E 
containing 8, L(B) = span (B - B), and M(B) denotes the smallest linear mani-
fold containing B. A point b E B is called an internal point of B if for each 
x E M(B) there exists e > 0 such that lAi < E implies b 	X(x - b) E B. 	if 	E 
replaces M(B) in this statement, the resulting definition is that of an 
algebraic interior point of 8.
2 
The set of algebraic interior points of B, 
the algebraic interior of B, is denoted by B 0 . 3 The algebraic hull of B, 
denoted by Ba , is the set of points x E E for which there exists a point b E B 
such that (b, x) 	B. 4 
The notion of internal point generalizes the concept of relative 
interior of a convex set to arbitrary dimensions. The key hypothesis of the 
Hahn-Banach theorem (aside from convexity and the axiom of choice) is the 
existence of an internal point. This hypothesis is superfluous in the finite 
dimensional case since every non-empty finite dimensional convex set has a 
non-empty relative interior and hence an internal point. This is no longer 
true for infinite dimensional convex sets [6:Example 1, p. 177], and the 
hypothesis is essential. 
2.2. Theorem. 	If B1, B 2 c E are convex, Bl has an internal point, 
B2 C M(B1) and B2 contains no internal point of B1, then there exists a 
nontrivial linear function f:E 	R such that f(bi) >(>) f(b9) for all b1 E B1 
(b 1 an internal point of B 1 ) and all b 2 E B 2 . 
-4- 
Proof: Let bi be an internal point of B 1 . Then 0 E E is an internal 
point of Bl - b? and 82 - b? contains no internal points of B 1 - b?. Since 
0 E B1 - b?, span (B1 - b?) = L(B1 - b?) = L(B1) = M(B1) - b? by [6:Ir 16.2.(3)]. 
By assumption B2 - b1 	M(B1) - b1. It follows from the Hahn-Banach theorem 
[6:A7 17.1.(3)] that there exists a nontrivial linear functional f:M(B i ) - b? + R 
and satisfying f(b i - b?) L.(>)f(b 2 - 0) for ever/ bl E B1 (b .1 an internal 
point of B1) and every b2 E B2. 5 By [6:f 9.2.(1)], f can be extended to a 
linear functional on all of E. Let f also denote such an extension. 	It fol- 
lows as in the above inequality that f(b 1 ) - f(b?) = f(b1 	b?) 	(>)f(b 2 - b7) 
= f(b 2 ) - f(bi), and the proof is complete. ❑ 
2.3. Remark. The hypothesis in 2.2. that B2 a M(B 1 ) is to ensure 
that the Hahn-Banach theorem can be applied to the appropriate subspace of E. 
In general, to apply this theorem to separate B1 and B2, the internal point 
assumption must be stated relative to a manifold (subspace) containing (trans-
lates of) both 81 and B2. 	In Section 3, B2 will be a singleton and the hypo- 
thesis will hold. 
The following assumption provides a useful sufficient condition for 
the sum of sets to have an internal point. 
2.4. Lemma. 	if B1, B2 	E, then M(B 1 + B2) = M(B1) + M(B2) = 
M(B 1 + M(B 2 )). 	If b i is an internal point of B., i = 1, 2, then b1 + b2 is 
an internal point of 81 + B2. 
Proof: If x E M(B1 + B2), then x = E2=1 yk (bi k + b2 k ), for some 










= 1, 2, and x = xi+ x2. To go the other way, write 
B1 + B2 = Ubial b1 	82. Then M(B1 + B2) = M(UblEB1 b1 	B2) 
	
M(131 	B2)  = 
bi + M(B2) for each 1:ij . E B . It follows that B1 + M(B2) = ug lal 	+ M(B 2 )) 
c M(B1 + B2) and hence M(B1 + M(B 2 )) g M(B1 + B 2 ). 	If x E M(B 1 ) + M(B2 ), then 
x = xl + x2 , where x i E M(B.), i = 1, 2. Suppose xl = E2. 1 ykbi k, bi k 
 E B1, 
y
k 
 E R, Zk=1   yk 
 = 1. Then x = E 
k=1 yk 
 (bik 
	2 + x2) E M(B1 + M(B2)), 
proving the 
first statement. 
To prove the second statement, let b91 be an internal point of B., 
= 1, 2. If x E M(B1 + B2), then by the first statement, x = xi + x2, where 
x. E M(B.), i = 1, 2. There exists E. > 0 such that 1A1 < e. implies 
b? + X(x i - b?) E B., i = 1, 2. Let e = min[ei,e2]. Then IA1 < c implies that 
b9 + A(x. - b9) E B., i = 1, 2, and hence b? + 133 + A(x1 + x2 - 	+ bD) E 
Bl + B2, and the proof is complete.E1 
2.5. Remark. The converse of the second statement of 2.4. is in 
general false. For example, if B? # 0, then (B 1 + B2) ° # 0 for any non-empty 
set B2. 	in particular, if b1 E 	then b1 + b 2 E (B1 + B2) 9 for any b2 E B"), 
but B2 need have no internal point. 
2.6. The Natural Topology. A convex set C g E such that C 9 # 0 is 
called a convex algebraic body or convex a-body [6:p. 180]. The collection of 
convex a-bodies is a base for a topology .79 for E called the natural topology  
for E [5:Section 3]. 6 This terminology is justified in several respects. The 
pair (E,.10 ) is a locally convex topological vector space [5:(3.3)], and hence 
a 
if E is finite dimensional, (E,7 ) is topologically isomorphic to Euclidean 
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n-space for some integer n [6:ff 15.5.(1)]. 	In general, :) is the finest locally 
convex topology for E [6:ff 18.5.(5)], every linear manifold in E is closed in 
(E,..7°) [5:(3.1)], and hence every linear functional on E is .7° continuous 
[6:.1115.9.(1)], as in the finite dimensional case. 	In particular, the linear 
functional of Theorem 2.2. is .7° continuous. 
If C 	E is a convex set, then the ..74 interior and the algebraic 
interior of C coincide [5:(2.1), (4.5)]. 	In addition, the set of internal 
points of a convex set C and the interior of C in the relative Y 0 topology 
for M(C) are the same. (If 0 E E is an internal point of a convex set C c E, 
then C = C n M(C), where C = C + H, H a complement of M(C) = L(C) [6:17 7.3.(3)]. 
It is easily verified that C is convex and 0E 
Let .7 denote a topology for E for which the pair (E,.2) is a topological 
vector space. If H is a subspace of E, H in the relative topology from ,1 is a 
topological vector space. If B E, B 0, then M(B) in the relative topology 
is homeomorphic to L(B) via the mapping x 	x+ x0, xo E B. The following is 
the topological analog of Theorem 2.2. 
2.7. Theorem. Let (E,../) be a topological vector space. 	If B1, 
B2 	E are convex, B1 has an interior point in M(B1), B2 C.; M(B1) and B2 con- 
tains no interior points (in M(61)) of B1, then there exists a Zr continuous 
nontrivial linear functional f:E 	R such that f(b1) 	(>) f(b 2 ) for all 
b1 E B1 (b1 an interior point of Bi in M(B1)), and all b2 E 82. 
Proof: Follow the proof of Theorem 2.2. using [6:17 17.1.(4)3 to 
obtain the existence of a continuous nontrivial linear functional f:L(BI) iR 
and satisfying the desired inequalities. To extend f, 7 note first that there 
-7- 
exists an open setUEZrwith 0 E U such that If(x)I <ifcr all x E U fl L(B1). 
Let U' denote the abso.ui_ convex cover of U fl L(81) DS:J"; 6.1]. 	if x E U', 
thenx= En a.
k
xk' xk  EUAL(B1), ak ER, Eiric=llak 1 s 1, and If(x)1 = k=1  
l E k=l ak f(x0 1 	Ek=ll akl If(x01 < 1. Let H be a complementary subspace of 
L(B1) and let U = 	H. Then U is an open absolutely convex set in E with 
0 E O. By [6:1T 16.4.(6), (7)2, the Minkowsky functional q of 0 is a continu-
ous semi-norm. 
The set U" is open in L(B1) [6:ff 16.1.(7)] and hence L(B1) = span (U"). 
If x E U', x 	0, then If(x)1 < 1 and If(x)1 -1 x E 	By [6:j7 16. 1 .(4)], 
I = ,E1(1f(x)1 1 x) = If(x)1 -1 4(x), and hence 4(x) = If(x)1. If x E L(B
1
), 
then for some X > 0, Xx E U'. Then If(x)1 = X
-1 
 If(Xx)I = X
-1  g(Xx) = Ci(x). 
Thus on the subspace L(B1), the continuous linear functional f is dominated 
in absolute value by the semi-norm i i which is defined and continuous on all 
of E. By an extension form of the Hahn-Banach theorem [6:ff 17.3.(5)], f can 
be extended to a continuous linear functional on all of E. ❑ 
3. An Optimum is a Quasi-Equilibrium 
3.1. Notation and Assumptions. With only minor changes, the nota-
tion in this section is the same as in [1]. The commodity space is denoted 
by E (instead of L), a vector space over R. No topological structure will be 
assumed for E.
8 




Z E X - Y, where 
1  
Y = E =1 Yj , si denotes the complete ordering of X. (consumer i's prefer- ' 
0 
‹. x:}, forE 
I 	I 	I 	 I 	I 	I 
each x. E X. and x. <. x: means x. s. x: and x: 4.. x., 	 , i = 1, ... m. , I 	I 	I I 	I I 	I 
-8- 
As:iump -cior,s 	 la;!-ctainted throughout 	section. 








)) = M(X i (x i )). 
0 
Proof- 	Let A. = M(X.(x.)) and M. = M(X.(x.)). 	Clearly A. 	m.. 1 	1 	1 I 	 I 	I 	 M t 
r ,r  
11 





	. - 	Let x° E X.(x.), 




 and k ,tm k -1-- 1, ..., r, 
xk t1 X.(x.), 0 5  k s r. 	By I - III, for each k = k + 1, ..., r, there exists 
1 	i 
) 	A.(x.) and X
k 
> 1 such that x k = Akx ()  + (1 - X k )x°. Then 
% P x ok E (x0 , xk.
i 	t 
r 17( 	 k _,.. ,r- , 	o k ..L. „r- 	 i 1 0 	k r 




	1, = and x E M..0 
3.3. 	Definitions. A state [(x?), (y?)] of the economy is called a 
j 






), v] satisfies [1:(2.1), (5.1), (5.2)]. 9 	For a given state of the 
economy [(x i ), (yj )] and each i' = 1, 	m, let 2 i ,[(x i ), (y j )] = X i .(x i ,) + 
- Y, where any of the sets X i (x i ) maybe empty; i = 1,...,m. 
3.4. Theorem. 	If [(x9), (y?)] is a Pareto optimum, and for some 
0 
0 
= 1, . 	, m, x., is not a saturation point and :Z.,[(x?) ' 	• (y°)] has an 
internal point, then there is a nontrivial linear functional v on E such that 
x2), (y?)] is a quasi-equilibrium relative to v. 
Proof: Let 7° E E denote total resources. Theme = x° - y°, where 
0 
isrlon-empty,convex,and7) (1—,1 —. By assumption 2., has an internal point. 
3y Lemmas 2.4. and 3.3., M(2 i ,) = 	 - M(Y) = 
Znii=1M (X
i (x i )) 	Enj=1 M(Y .1 ), and hence f E M(2 i .). 
	
By Theorem 2.2., there 	a nontrivial linear functional v on E such 
0 
that v(z) z v(?) for every 	E 	Arguing exactly as in [1:Theorem 2], it 
follows that [(x9), (ycl)] is a quasi-equilibrium relative to v.0 
3.5. Remark. Note that nowhere in the proof of Theorem 3.4. or in 
Debreu's proof [1:Theorem 2] is continuity of the linear functional v required. 
The , nly place where a limiting argument is used is in obtaining [1:b), p. 
,nd there linearity of V suffices [1:(4.2)]. Of course the functional v is 
0 
-coatinuous„but this is synonymous with linearity. The topological dual of 
( 	.:() is the algebraic dual of E. 
3.6. Remark, Suppose CE :T.) is a topological vector space. Theorem 
3.4. r - mains valid if the internal point assumption is replaced by the assump-




14x9), (0)]). 	In this version, it follows from Thearem 2.7. that the func- 
tional v can be taken to be ,T - continuous, and the result is free of dimension-
ality restrictions. 
3.7. Assumption. 	If E is finite dimensional, then under I - IV of 




has an internal point as does X i (x i ) if these sets are non-empty. By (the back 
0 
docr of) Lemma 2.4., 2.1 .1(x i ), (yj )] has an internal point whenever this set 
-10- 
is non-empty. The following assumption extends this trivial conclusion to the 
nontrivial infinite dimensional case. 
V.' For each j, Y. has an internal point and for each i and x. E X., 
X.
t
(x.) has an internal point. 




..., 	 y. t V., j = 1, 	n, and if 2 1 .[(x.,), (n)J 	0, then Zx.), 
/ 
J 	J  
has an internal point. 
Proof: Follows at once from Lemma 2.4. and the following. U 
3.9. 	Lemma. 	Under I - III of [1], if X 1 (x 1 ) has an internal point 
0 
x9 and X.(x.) # 0, then x9 E i. (x.) and x9 is an internal point of b 
1 	 1 	1 1 	I
X.(x.). 
1 1 	 1  
Proof: Let x9 be as hypothesized and let x9° t X.(x.). For A > 1, 
t 	 1 	t 	i 
let x
A 
 = Ax9 + (1- X)x9°. Then xA 
	1 
E M(X.(x.)) and since x9 is an internal point 
1 	 1 
of 	 [x9, X.
t
(x.), for some y E (0, 1), [x9 yxA 
 + (1 - y)x9] 	X.(x.). 	By I - III, 
1 11 
for every S e (0, 1), 5(yxA 
 + (1 - y)x?) + (1 - 13)xcp E X i (x i ). 	Let 
-1 
5 = (yX + (1 - y)) 	. Since A x 1, 0 < a < 1, and hence 5(yxX 
+ (1 - y)x
i
9) + 
(1 - 5)x9° = x? E ()C i (x i ). 	Also, by definition, if x E M(X i (x i )), there is an 
e > 0 such that x9 + A"(x - x9) E X.(x.) for 1A1 < e. Using I - III again, 
t 	 1 	1 	1 
X.(x.) may be replaced by ;(.(x.) since x9 E X. (x) .13 
	
1 	 1 
3.10. Remarks. Assumption k - involves no dimensionality restrictions 
on the sets X.(x i ) and Y., but it does provide a sufficient condition for the 
internal point hypothesis of Theorem 3.4 to hold. In comparing V - and El : V] 
we note that every infinite dimensional Banach space has a dense maximal subspace 
H whose open half spaces H+ and H have empty interiors (in the c im topology) 
but (e) 0 = 14+ and (H - ) 0 	H- TIS:p. 450]. 
3.11 Interpretation.  The economic interpretation of V - is as follows. 
For a production set V i , the subspace L(Y ..1 ) can be thought of as the space of 
possible directions or changes in production plans. For 	d E E and y + d .E Y. 
for some y EY. then d E L(Y.). A direction d E L(Y 7 ) is feasible at y E Y. if 
changes in y of arbitrarily small scale in the direction d are feasible, i.e., if 
for some e > 0, y + Ad E Y. for 0 < A < E. All possible directions are feasible 
at y E Yj if and only if y is an internal point of Yj . Similarly, for a 
consumption set X i and x i E X i , the subspace L(X i (x i )) is the space of possible 
directions or changes in consumption plans at least as preferred as x i that 
remain at least as preferred as x i . Such a direction d E L(X i (xj)) is feasible 
and preferred relative to x i at x E X i (xi) if changes in x of arbitrarily small 
scale in the direction d are feasible and remain at least as preferred as x i , i.e., 
if for some E > 0, x 	Ad E X 1 (x-1 ) for 0 < A < E. All possible such directions 
are feasible and preferred relative to x i at x E Xi(xi) if and only if x is an 
internal point of Xi(xi). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This research was st r -- r 	rational Science Foundation Grant 
SOC-7820169 to the Georgia Institute of Technology. Typing support was 
given by the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. I am grateful 
to Larry Selden for encouraging this work. 
2. The notion of internal point varies in the literature. The definition given 
here coincides with the notion of a point in the "intrinsic core" in 
[4 :pp. 7-8]. The definition given in [6:p. 176] is ambiguous and could be 
taken to mean that b is an internal point of B if for each x EM(B), there 
exists x > 0 such that b 	X(x - b) E B. If B is convex, this interpretation 
is equivalent to the definition in the text and it is in the convex case 
where the notion is used in [6]. (That these two are not equivalent when 
B is not required to be convex can be seen by taking E = R and B the set 
{-1, 0, 1}. Clearly 0 is an internal point in the weaker sense above, but 
B contains no interval.) The concept of internal point used in [3:Definition 7, 
p. 410] and in [7:p.204] and the concept of a point In the "core" of a set in 
[5:p. 445] all coincide with that of an algebraic interior point. 
3. The algebraic interior of a set is synonymous with its "core" or "algebraic 
core" in [4], [5]. Subject to the ambiguity of footnote 1, the term 
"algebraic kernel" is used in [6:p. 177]. 
4. Ba is synonymous with "lin B" in [5:p. 448]. 
5. Kothe refers to [6:- ff-+27-.1- : -(3)] as the algebraic form of the separation 
theorem and he reserves the name "Nahn-Banach theorem" for similar results 
[6:ff 17.2.]. The linear functional associated with the hyperplane of 
[6:ff 17.1.(3)] comes from [6:ff 15.9.(1)]. 
6. This typology is identified in [6:p. 214], but the term "natural topology" 
has a different meanl..g 	300]. 
7. The extension of f is immediate from [6:ff 20.1 . (1)] if 	is locally 
convex. 
8. The natural topology will perforce be involved. C.f. Section 2.6. above. 
9. The term "quasi-equilibrium" is suggested by its use in [2] and by 
[1:Remark]. 
